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IS DISPARATE IMPACT HAVING ANY
IMPACT? AN APPELLATE ANALYSIS OF
FORTY YEARS OF DISPARATE IMPACT
CLAIMS UNDER THE FAIR HOUSING ACT
STACY E. SEICSHNAYDRE*
After four decades of unanimity in the circuit courts, with several denials of
certiorari by the Supreme Court, the Court has recently granted certiorari in
two cases to resolve the apparently settled question of whether the disparate
impact theory is cognizable under the Fair Housing Act (FHA). Although
these two recent cases, Magner v. Gallagher and Mount Holly v. Mount
Holly Gardens Citizens in Action, Inc., may have raised questions about
the potential reach of disparate impact theory, they are not representative FHA
cases with respect to their outcomes or their facts. The circuit courts in both
cases reversed summary judgment and reinstated plaintiffs’ disparate impact
claims, which is exceedingly rare given its occurrence only twice before in forty
years. In general, plaintiffs have obtained positive outcomes in only 20% of
their FHA disparate impact claims considered on appeal. Further, plaintiffs’
positive FHA disparate impact outcomes have been affirmed only 33.3 % of
the time, compared with defendants’ affirmance rate of 83.8%. The facts of
Magner and Mount Holly are not representative considering that these
disparate impact challenges were made against housing improvement plans,
rather than housing barriers. Housing improvement challenges typically seek
to prevent the disproportionate displacement of minorities from existing
housing opportunities, whereas housing barrier challenges seek to remove
barriers and create housing opportunities for minorities where they do not
presently exist. Only one other housing improvement case prior to Magner
* William K. Christovich Associate Professor of Law, Tulane Law School. The
Author would like to acknowledge the invaluable feedback and editorial assistance
received from Stephen M. Dane, Joseph Rich, Florence W. Roisman, Robert G.
Schwemm, and Morgan W. Williams. Special thanks to Tulane Law School for
supporting the work on this Article and to Elliot Singer and Justin Pierre-Louis for
their helpful research assistance. Thanks as always to GLE.
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and Mount Holly had resulted in a positive outcome for plaintiffs in forty
years.
Housing barrier challenges almost always further the
nondiscrimination and integration purposes of the FHA.
Housing
improvement challenges may or may not further the purposes of the FHA,
depending on the facts of the case. This means that summary judgment will
not be appropriate in some housing improvement cases. Housing barrier cases
represent the predominant type of FHA disparate impact claim considered on
appeal and the predominant type of claim among those on which plaintiffs
have obtained positive outcomes. Given the persistence of residential racial
segregation and Congress’s purpose in enacting the FHA to eliminate such
segregation, the disparate impact theory remains a vital tool for overcoming
barriers to housing opportunity and should be upheld.
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INTRODUCTION
For forty years, the Fair Housing Act (FHA) has prohibited not
only practices that are undertaken pursuant to a discriminatory
motive, but also unjustified practices with discriminatory effects.1
Every circuit court to decide the question, which includes all but the
D.C. Circuit, has considered the broad purposes of the FHA and
analogous interpretations of Title VII and determined that liability
can be imposed under the FHA on a showing of discriminatory
effects.2 The Supreme Court has never squarely addressed the
question but after repeatedly denying certiorari in the earliest
appellate cases to apply a disparate impact standard, it issued a per
curiam affirmance of an appellate finding of disparate impact in an
FHA case.3
The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD) issued a final rule in 2013 establishing uniform
standards for evaluating FHA effects claims.4
Prior to the
promulgation of its regulation, HUD, like the courts, had long
interpreted the FHA to prohibit discriminatory effects, even in the
absence of any evidence of discriminatory intent.5
Despite the well-settled nature of the jurisprudence and HUD’s
regulatory interpretation, the Supreme Court recently decided to
review the disparate impact standard as a method of proof under the
FHA.6 After the Supreme Court granted certiorari in 2011 in an
Eighth Circuit decision upholding the disparate impact claim on an
unusual set of facts, the City of St. Paul, the petitioner in the case,
decided to withdraw its petition, thus preventing Supreme Court
review.7 However, in 2012, the township of Mount Holly, New Jersey
1. See ROBERT G. SCHWEMM & SARA K. PRATT, NAT’L FAIR HOUSING ALLIANCE,
DISPARATE IMPACT UNDER THE FAIR HOUSING ACT: A PROPOSED APPROACH 3 (2009),
available at http://www.nationalfairhousing.org/Portals/33/DISPARATE%20IMPACT
%20ANALYSIS%20FINAL.pdf (“Four decades of . . . litigation has produced a strong
consensus that the Act does include an impact standard.”).
2. See id. at 6–7 (citing cases from each circuit).
3. See Town of Huntington v. Huntington Branch, NAACP, 488 U.S. 15, 18
(1988) (per curiam) (refusing to reach the question of the appropriateness of the
disparate impact test).
4. Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects Standard,
78 Fed. Reg. 11,460, 11,463 (Feb. 15, 2013) (codified at 24 C.F.R. pt. 100).
5. Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects
Standard, 76 Fed. Reg. 70,921, 70,921 (proposed Nov. 16, 2011) (to be codified
at 24 C.F.R. pt. 100).
6. Twp. of Mount Holly v. Mt. Holly Gardens Citizens in Action, Inc., 133 S. Ct.
2824 (2013) (granting petition for writ of certiorari to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit), cert. dismissed, No. 11-1507, 2013 WL 6050174 (Nov. 15, 2013);
Magner v. Gallagher, 132 S. Ct. 548 (2011) (granting petition for writ of certiorari to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit).
7. Magner, 132 S. Ct. 1306 (2012) (dismissing certiorari pursuant to Rule 46.1 of
the Rules of the Supreme Court).

SEICSHNAYDRE.OFF.TO.WEBSITE (DO NOT DELETE)

1/9/2014 3:50 PM

360

[Vol. 63:357

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

subsequently filed a similar petition for certiorari in a separate case,
which provided the Court with another opportunity to review the
theory.8 The Court granted the petition in the summer of 2013,9 but
that case also resolved prior to oral argument, again preventing
Supreme Court review.10
Why would the Court intervene to assess disparate impact theory in
housing cases after allowing the theory to rest undisturbed for so
many decades? Is it possible to trace the evolution of the theory from
its first appearance in housing jurisprudence to determine whether
the theory has strayed from its original function? Is the theory still
necessary and important in accomplishing the congressional purpose
of the FHA, which, beyond the overarching nondiscrimination goal
“to provide, within constitutional limitations, for fair housing
throughout the United States,”11 also includes the integration goal of
replacing segregated neighborhoods with “truly integrated and
balanced living patterns”?12
In exploring the possible causes of the Court’s recent scrutiny of
disparate impact theory in housing cases, this Article examines two
types of housing regulation.13 One type of regulation may be
described as “housing barrier” regulation. The earliest disparate
impact cases brought under the FHA challenged this type of
regulation.14 A housing barrier regulation may operate in one of
8. Mt. Holly Gardens Citizens in Action, Inc. v. Twp. of Mount Holly, 658 F.3d
375 (3d Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 2824 (2013), and cert. dismissed, 2013 WL
6050174 (November 15, 2013).
9. Mount Holly, 133 S. Ct. 2824 (2013) (granting petition for writ of certiorari to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit).
10. Mount Holly, 2013 WL 6050174 (Nov. 15, 2013)(dismissing certiorari
pursuant to Rule 46.1 of the Rules of the Supreme Court).
11. 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (2012).
12. Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 211 (1972) (quoting 114
CONG. REC. 3422 (1968) (statement of Sen. Walter Mondale)). Courts are sometimes
“faced with a conflict between the goal of integration and the goal of expanding
minority housing opportunities,” such as in the context of tenant selection policies
designed to maintain integration by limiting the number of housing units for
minority group members. ROBERT G. SCHWEMM, HOUSING DISCRIMINATION LAW AND
LITIGATION § 7.3 (2013 ed.). Congress did not consider the conflict because it
“believed that integration and nondiscrimination were complementary goals.” Id.
(citing United States v. Starrett City Assoc., 840 F.2d 1096 (2d. Cir. 1988)).
13. For a description of other types of housing regulation and practices that are
subject to challenge using disparate impact theory, see infra Parts III.B, and
Appendix B. For example, several industry trade groups representing homeowners’
insurers recently filed a federal complaint seeking to block enforcement of HUD’s
disparate impact rule against their members. American Ins. Ass’n v. HUD, No. 1:13cv-00966 (D.D.C. filed June 26, 2013).
14. See, e.g., Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126, 149 (3d Cir. 1977)
(affirming finding of racial impact in termination of a public housing project by city
agencies following the urban renewal clearance of black families and creation of allwhite community); Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d
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several respects: to prevent the construction of housing that will
likely be used by minority groups in places that currently lack
minority residents; to confine housing that will be used by minority
group members to neighborhoods where minority households
already predominate; or to otherwise deny minority households
freedom of movement in a wider housing marketplace.15 In short,
housing barrier regulations frequently perpetuate racial segregation.
The other type of regulation, which has recently captured the Court’s
attention, may be called “housing improvement” regulation. This is a
regulation or plan purportedly designed to improve the condition of
housing and/or the surrounding neighborhood, typically through
some combination of demolition and replacement of housing units,
but also through other means such as the imposition of minimum
housing standards or revitalization plans.16 The challenges to such a
regulation typically center on the involuntary displacement of
residents
from
their
homes,
with
such
displacement
disproportionately affecting minorities.17
The remedy sought is a key distinction between the disparate
impact challenges to these two types of regulation. The remedy for a
successful disparate impact challenge to a housing barrier regulation
is the removal of the housing barrier and the creation of housing
opportunities where they might not have previously existed, whereas
the remedy for a disparate impact challenge to a housing
improvement regulation is usually preventing displacement from
housing opportunities where they already exist. If successful, a
disparate impact challenge to a housing barrier regulation will almost
always further both the nondiscrimination and the integration
purposes of the FHA.18 A disparate impact challenge to a housing
improvement regulation may or may not further the twin purposes of
1283, 1285, 1294 (7th Cir. 1977) (ruling that the Village of Arlington Heights’s
refusal to relax a zoning ordinance requiring single family homes would violate the
FHA if it would effectively prevent the construction of low-cost housing anywhere
within the confines of the municipality); United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d
1179, 1183, 1188 (8th Cir. 1974) (holding that a zoning ordinance barring the
construction of new multi-family housing units in a predominantly white area
violated the FHA).
15. See infra Part I (assessing early FHA disparate impact challenges to housing
barrier regulations).
16. See infra Part II (analyzing disparate impact challenges to housing
improvement regulations).
17. See infra Part II (discussing zoning ordinances that displaced residents through
condemnations, demolitions, and redevelopment plans, among other methods).
18. See SCHWEMM, supra note 12, § 7.3 (“[I]n exclusionary zoning cases . . . the
conclusion that Title VIII is designed to promote integration has generally led courts
to an expansive interpretation of the statute that advances the housing opportunities
of minorities.”).
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the FHA, as more fully described below.19 Accordingly, disparate
impact challenges to housing improvement regulations must be
analyzed with particular care to ensure that the FHA’s purposes of
expanded housing opportunity and integration are furthered by such
challenges. This Article concludes that this careful analysis can be
accomplished consistent with the proof standards articulated in
HUD’s regulation.
Given the persistence of residential racial segregation and
Congress’s purpose in enacting the FHA to eliminate such
segregation, the disparate impact theory remains a relevant, if
misunderstood, tool for accomplishing Congress’s purpose.
Consequently, the disparate impact theory should be upheld.
Part I of this Article considers the earliest applications of the
disparate impact theory in FHA cases, which involve challenges to
housing barrier regulations.
It then considers more recent
applications of the theory challenging barrier regulations and argues
that the theory remains relevant and effective in removing barriers to
housing opportunity and mobility, thereby curbing the perpetuation
of segregation.
In Part II, this Article explores two recent cases that illustrate the
vulnerability of the disparate impact theory when used to challenge
housing improvement regulations. In both cases, the circuit courts
reversed summary judgment granted by the district courts and
reinstated the disparate impact claims. Defendant-appellees in both
cases petitioned for Supreme Court review, with the Court granting
certiorari in each (with both cases dismissed by the petitioner shortly
before oral argument).
These recent successes for plaintiffappellants in the housing improvement context have given the
Supreme Court an opening to attack the theory when it would appear
to stymie local government efforts to counteract neighborhood
blight. What is misleading about the two recent summary judgment
reversals is that they mask an overwhelmingly unsuccessful track
record for plaintiffs challenging housing improvement regulations
and plans using FHA disparate impact theory. This Article conducts
a qualitative review of the cases and finds only one other success in
this context for plaintiffs at the appellate level, consisting of an
affirmance of a trial court ruling for plaintiffs with a remand to
determine whether plaintiffs’ requested relief (re-occupancy) would
actually further the purposes of the FHA.20
19. See infra Part IV.
20. Charleston Hous. Auth. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 419 F.3d 729 (8th Cir. 2005).
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Part III of this Article reports a quantitative analysis of forty years of
FHA disparate impact appellate jurisprudence and finds that the
courts have had little difficulty disposing of all manner of disparate
impact claims under the FHA. Plaintiffs have received positive
decisions in only 20%, or eighteen of the ninety-two FHA disparate
impact claims considered on appeal. Although defendants were able
to have 83.8% of their positive FHA disparate impact outcomes
affirmed on appeal, plaintiffs were able to hold onto only 33.3% of
their positive outcomes. Plaintiffs have been able to reverse only four
summary judgments in forty years, including the two recent reversals
granted review by the Court. These data also reveal that, at the
appellate level, the predominant type of FHA disparate impact claim,
and the predominant type of claim on which plaintiffs are receiving
positive outcomes, is the housing barrier claim.
Comparing
plaintiffs’ outcomes in housing barrier and housing improvement
cases, plaintiffs succeeded twice as often in housing barrier cases
(42%) than in housing improvement cases (21%). These findings
are illustrated in more detail in Figures 1 through 9.
Part IV reviews the standards recently proposed by HUD for
analyzing FHA disparate impact claims and considers whether they
might be applied to housing improvement regulations in a way that
furthers the nondiscrimination and integration purposes of the
statute. The FHA is concerned with opportunity, not maintaining the
status quo of substandard, segregated housing. If the challenged
plan, which must be supported by evidence, revitalizes housing while
setting the stage for exclusion and increased segregation, then it will
be difficult to justify as legitimate and nondiscriminatory. On the
other hand, if the plan revitalizes housing while creating opportunity
and integration, then plaintiffs will be hard-pressed to identify a less
discriminatory alternative. If history is any judge, most housing
improvement challenges would continue to be decided on summary
judgment. However, summary judgment will not always be an
appropriate vehicle for resolving these challenges. Community and
neighborhood revitalization plans will almost always be legitimate in
the abstract but whether they are racially exclusionary will depend on
the facts of a particular case.
Part V briefly considers whether the FHA disparate impact theory is
likely to survive Supreme Court review, assuming that the Court
continues to grant certiorari on the issue. Although it leaves the
briefing of the statutory construction issue to the litigants, this Article
observes that the earliest appellate courts to review the theory
engaged in a statutory construction analysis. They interpreted the
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FHA consistent with the Supreme Court’s interpretation of Title VII,
which recognized a discriminatory effects method of proof. Given
that Congress did not simultaneously consider the FHA when it
amended Title VII to include the disparate impact standard, it is odd
that the Court would jettison the disparate impact theory without
questioning any of the other proof methods borrowed from Title VII,
such as that created by the Court for disparate treatment cases in
McDonnell Douglas. Of perhaps most relevance, the Court recently
recognized the disparate impact method of proof in age
discrimination cases with Justice Scalia casting the deciding vote on
the basis of his deference to the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC).21
Part VI of this Article addresses whether the FHA disparate impact
theory should survive, given its limited success and potential for
perverse outcomes in housing improvement cases. This Article
concludes that the most perverse consequence of all would be the
Court’s revocation of the disparate impact method of proof in all
FHA cases, even those challenging housing barrier regulations.
There is no need for panic over the use of disparate impact theory in
the housing improvement context because these claims are factintensive and can further the purposes of the FHA if improvement
plans set the stage for exclusion. The appellate courts have
overwhelmingly controlled for perverse outcomes considering the
forty-year history of the FHA. This Article concludes that despite the
limitations of disparate impact theory, it remains a vital tool for
eliminating the segregation the FHA was enacted to combat.
I.

THE ROLE OF HOUSING BARRIER CASES IN EARLY FHA DISPARATE
IMPACT CHALLENGES

Litigants have used the disparate impact theory over the years to
challenge a variety of housing-related regulations, policies, practices,
and decisions.22 For example, in addition to housing barrier and
housing improvement challenges operating at the neighborhood or
municipal level, litigants have used the disparate impact theory to
challenge tenant assignment or rental policies operating at the level
of a single landlord or apartment complex.23 Others litigants have
21. Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 247 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring).
22. See infra Figure 7, Appendix B.
23. See infra Figure 7, Appendix B; see also Graoch Assocs. #33, L.P. v.
Louisville/Jefferson Cnty. Metro Human Relations Comm’n, 508 F.3d 366, 369 (6th
Cir. 2007) (affirming summary judgment dismissal of disparate impact claim
challenging landlord withdrawal from section 8 program based on failure to establish
prima facie case); Mountain Side Mobile Estates P’ship v. Sec’y of Hous. & Urban
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used the theory to challenge home lending and insurance practices.24
The authoritative decisions have recognized “two kinds of racially
discriminatory effects which a facially neutral decision about housing
can produce.”25 The first kind of impact occurs in the form of “a
greater adverse impact on one racial group than on another.”26 The
second is evaluated with respect to the impact on the community
involved:
“if it perpetuates segregation and thereby prevents
interracial association it will be considered invidious under the Fair
Housing Act independently of the extent to which it produces a
disparate effect on different racial groups.”27 These two kinds of
effects may be present individually or in combination in both housing
barrier and housing improvement cases. Regardless, effects alone do
not establish liability under the FHA.28 Housing improvement
regulations tend to involve the first kind of impact challenge, whereas
housing barrier regulations tend to implicate the second kind,
though not always.
The earliest FHA cases analyzing disparate impact theory involve
challenges to housing barrier regulations and illustrate the
continuing salience of disparate impact theory under the FHA. For
example, in United States v. City of Black Jack,29 decided in 1974, a nonprofit organization challenged an ordinance prohibiting the
construction of any new multi-family dwellings in the virtually allwhite suburban city of Black Jack, Missouri.30 The nonprofit, the
Inter Religious Center for Urban Affairs, had sought “to create
alternative housing opportunities for persons of low and moderate
income living in the ghetto areas of St. Louis” in the form of 108
Dev., 56 F.3d 1243, 1254, 1257 (10th Cir. 1995) (reversing, based on adequate
showing of business necessity, HUD Secretary’s decision that found a three-person
occupancy limit in a mobile home park created a disparate impact); Betsey v. Turtle
Creek Assocs., 736 F.2d 983, 985 (4th Cir. 1984) (reversing bench trial decision
against plaintiffs on disparate impact claim challenging building-wide evictions
pursuant to new, all-adult rental policy, finding that plaintiffs established a prima
facie case).
24. See, e.g., Estate of Davis v. Wells Fargo Bank, 633 F.3d 529, 539, 541 (7th Cir.
2011) (affirming summary judgment for lack of evidence showing defendant’s
conduct had a racially based disparate impact on borrowers); Simms v. First Gibraltar
Bank, 83 F.3d 1546, 1555 (5th Cir. 1996) (reversing jury finding of disparate impact
of bank’s refusal to issue a commitment letter to cooperative housing owners because
claim cannot be based on “a single act or decision”).
25. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1290
(7th Cir. 1977); see also Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 844
F.2d 926, 937 (2d Cir.) (same), aff’d per curiam, 488 U.S. 15 (1988).
26. Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d at 1290.
27. Id.; see infra note 244-49 and accompanying text.
28. See infra note 94 and accompanying text.
29. 508 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1974).
30. Id. at 1183.
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units of two-story townhouses.31
The city of Black Jack was
incorporated following public awareness of the planned housing
development, whereupon the residents acquired the zoning power to
restrict multi-family development.32 The district court had found
that the virtually all-white population in the suburbs of St. Louis
County had doubled and triggered a housing boom, whereas blacks
were concentrated “in the city and in pockets in the county,”
thereby confined disproportionately “in overcrowded or
substandard accommodations.”33
In reviewing the challenged housing barrier regulation, the Eighth
Circuit analogized to Title VII protections against barriers to equal
employment: “[j]ust as Congress ‘requires the removal of artificial,
arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to employment when the barriers
operate invidiously to discriminate on the basis of racial or other
impermissible classification[,]’ such barriers must also give way in the
field of housing.”34 Thus, the court was explicit in its treatment of the
challenged regulation as a market barrier that restricted the housing
choices of blacks.35 Such a barrier regulation, if shown to have a
racial impact, would be antithetical to the twin purposes of the FHA.
As the court noted, local discretion “must be curbed where the clear
result of such discretion is the segregation of low-income [b]lacks
from all [w]hite neighborhoods.”36 Regardless of whether such a
barrier regulation was racially motivated or merely “artificial,
arbitrary, and unnecessary,” the court found that “[e]ffect, and not
motivation, is the touchstone.”37
The rationale is similar to that used in employment cases. Neutral
regulations or practices with discriminatory effects can operate as the
functional equivalent of intentional discrimination.38
In the
particular factual context of City of Black Jack, a neutral zoning
regulation prohibiting multi-family housing in an all-white suburb of
St. Louis would have achieved the same effect as a facially
discriminatory zoning ordinance. The court found that “[t]he

31. Id. at 1182.
32. Id. at 1182–83.
33. Id. at 1183.
34. Id. at 1184 (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971)).
35. Id.
36. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
37. Id. at 1184–85.
38. See Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 987 (1988) (“[T]he
necessary premise of the disparate impact approach is that some employment
practices, adopted without a deliberately discriminatory motive, may in operation be
functionally equivalent to intentional discrimination.”).
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ultimate effect of the ordinance was to foreclose 85 percent of the
blacks living in the metropolitan area from obtaining housing in
Black Jack, and to foreclose them at a time when 40 percent of them
were living in substandard or overcrowded units.”39 As the Eighth
Circuit stated: “‘we now firmly recognize that the arbitrary quality of
thoughtlessness can be as disastrous and unfair to private rights and
the public interest as the perversity of a willful scheme.’”40 The
Supreme Court denied certiorari in the case.41
In another seminal disparate impact case brought under the FHA,
Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights,42
the Seventh Circuit in 1977 favorably reviewed a disparate impact
challenge to a zoning barrier regulation.
A religious order
contracted with a housing development corporation to create 190
townhouse units of low-cost housing that were to be racially
integrated.43 The developer petitioned for rezoning of the property
(zoned for single-family detached homes) to allow for construction of
multi-family units.44 After a winding procedural history in which the
Supreme Court reversed the Seventh Circuit’s prior ruling that a
racially disparate impact violated the Equal Protection Clause,45 the
Seventh Circuit on remand decided that a racial impact could violate
the FHA.46 The court noted that Arlington Heights remained almost
totally white and a refusal to rezone the plaintiffs’ land for an
integrated, multi-family development “had the effect of perpetuating
segregation.”47 Analogizing to Title VII, and considering the broad
purposes of Congress in enacting Title VIII, the court found that a
violation of the FHA could be established without a showing of
discriminatory intent.48 Applying a four-part balancing test,49 the
39. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d at 1186.
40. Id. at 1185 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Eighth Circuit notes in
dicta that there was also evidence in the record to support a finding of discriminatory
intent in the enactment of the housing barrier regulation. However, the court
decided to rest its holding on the disparate impact theory. Id. at 1185 n.3.
41. United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
422 U.S. 1042 (1975).
42. 558 F.2d 1283 (7th Cir. 1977).
43. Id. at 1286.
44. Id.
45. See Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 254–
55, 264–65 (1977) (holding that proof of intent is required to establish a violation of
the Equal Protection Clause (citing Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976))). The
Supreme Court also affirmed the lower courts’ ruling that the plaintiffs had not
carried their burden of proving discriminatory purpose. Id. at 270.
46. Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d at 1290.
47. Id. at 1288.
48. Id. at 1288–90.
49. The court considered the following: (1) the strength of plaintiff’s showing of
discriminatory effect; (2) whether there was some showing of discriminatory intent;
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court weighed in plaintiffs’ favor the fact that Arlington Heights was
overwhelmingly segregated and plaintiffs merely sought to enjoin the
defendant “from interfering with their plans to dedicate their [own]
land to furthering the congressionally sanctioned goal of integrated
housing.”50 The court considered it a close case, remanding to the
district court the question whether the development could be built
on other land that was already zoned for multi-family development.51
But ultimately, the court held that it “must decide close cases in favor
of integrated housing.”52 The Supreme Court denied certiorari in
this second Seventh Circuit decision.53
A third case demonstrating the prominent role of zoning barrier
regulations in early disparate impact challenges brought under the
FHA is Resident Advisory Board v. Rizzo,54 decided in 1977. Prior to
demolition in 1960, 46% of a five-block area designated for public
housing in the Whitman Urban Renewal Area in South Philadelphia
had been occupied by black families.55 After demolition of the site
dedicated for public housing, the Redevelopment Authority of
Philadelphia condemned several additional blocks of row houses in
the area adjacent to the public housing site.56 New single-family
residences were built in these adjacent areas and were occupied by
white families.57 Government-funded urban renewal efforts, then,
transformed the southeast Whitman neighborhood of Philadelphia
from an integrated neighborhood to an all-white neighborhood.58
The public housing rebuilding process that followed sparked
considerable controversy. After a ten-year planning period for the
public housing site, in 1970, various city agencies (with the approval
of the Mayor and City Council) selected a developer to construct 120
detached townhouses.59 Following community opposition, which
included “thirty women . . . gather[ing] around the bulldozer and
backhoe, blocking the operations of the contractor, refusing to leave
(3) the defendant’s interest in taking its challenged action; and (4) whether the
plaintiff sought to affirmatively compel the provision of housing or merely restrain
the defendant from interfering with the provision of housing. Id. at 1290.
50. Id. at 1293 (discussing the remedy sought by plaintiffs); see id. at 1291 & n.9
(describing the continued racial segregation of Arlington Heights).
51. Id. at 1293–94.
52. Id. at 1294.
53. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283 (7th Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1025 (1978).
54. 564 F.2d 126 (3d Cir. 1977).
55. Id. at 131.
56. Id. at 132.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 133.
59. Id.
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the property when so requested,” various city agencies withheld
police assistance, blocked construction, and sought to cancel the
project.60 A newly elected mayor campaigned on a platform of
blocking public housing (which he equated with “[b]lack housing”)
from being constructed in white neighborhoods in the city.61 State
court litigation proceeded but was ineffective in resolving the
controversy.62 A class of plaintiffs living in segregated neighborhoods
in Philadelphia and eligible to reside in the project, as well as two
organizational plaintiffs, filed a federal action in 1971.63 After over
four years of “pretrial maneuvering”64 a fifty-seven day trial
commenced in 1975, resulting in the entry of injunctions in 1976
against the city and its agencies ordering them to “take all necessary
steps” for construction of the project and to refrain from taking any
action in interference with construction.65
On appeal, the Third Circuit upheld the district court’s finding
that the city had acted with discriminatory intent.66 As for the other
city agencies, the Philadelphia Housing Authority and the
Redevelopment Authority of Philadelphia, the court applied a
disparate impact test and held that “in Title VIII cases, by analogy to
Title VII cases, unrebutted proof of discriminatory effect alone may
justify a federal equitable response.”67 The court upheld the district
court’s finding that the agencies’ actions had a discriminatory impact,
noting that their termination of the public housing project was
undertaken “in connection with [other] urban renewal activities” that
transformed an integrated community into one in which “virtually no
black families were to be found.”68 The court also found that blacks
made up “a substantial proportion of those who would be eligible to

60. Id. at 134–37. Despite the compatibility of the project with the surrounding
neighborhood and the potential for the public housing tenants to become
homeowners, the local neighborhood organization reversed course and withdrew its
support for the project. Id. at 134.
61. Id. at 136.
62. Id. at 135–36.
63. Id. at 137.
64. Id. at 136.
65. Id. at 138.
66. Id. at 144–45. The court noted the city’s joining in the community’s racially
motivated opposition, the (Democratic) mayor’s explicitly racial statements equating
public housing with “‘[b]lack housing’” and his refusals to place such housing in
white neighborhoods, and the city’s steps to terminate the project with knowledge of
the racially discriminatory effect. Id. at 142.
67. Id. at 146. Further, the court explained that Congress in 1968 rejected an
amendment to Title VIII that would have required proof of discriminatory intent. Id.
at 147 (citing 114 CONG. REC. 5221–22 (1968) (statement of Sen. Baker)).
68. Id. at 149.
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reside” in the terminated project.69 Cancellation of the housing
project “erased” an opportunity for blacks to leave highly segregated
neighborhoods and “contributed to the maintenance of segregated
housing in Philadelphia.”70 After determining that the city agencies
offered no justifications for their actions to terminate the housing
project, the court upheld the district court’s injunctions against
these agencies.71 The Supreme Court denied certiorari in the
case.72
Housing barrier regulations continued to provide fertile ground
for disparate impact challenges in subsequent decades.73 In the
1980s, in Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington,74 plaintiffs
challenged a zoning scheme that “restrict[ed] private construction of
multi-family housing to a narrow urban renewal” zone where minority
residents already resided, and a refusal to amend the zoning
ordinance to allow private multi-family construction in a white
neighborhood where virtually no minorities resided.75 Housing Help,
Inc., one of the plaintiffs challenging the zoning scheme, proposed
development of 162 units in a neighborhood that was 98% white for
tenants expected to include significant numbers of minority group
members.76 The Second Circuit found that plaintiffs easily met their
prima facie burden because they were able to demonstrate, in
addition to other elements, both a “disproportionate harm” to blacks
and a “segregative impact on the entire community.”77 The court

69. Id. The court had previously noted that the waiting list for public housing in
Philadelphia was composed primarily of racial minorities—95%. Id. at 142.
70. Id. at 142.
71. Id. at 150. When reading Rizzo, one cannot help but wonder whether the
residents might have brought a disparate impact challenge to the urban renewal plan
before they were displaced. At the same time, would such a challenge have been
premature? Was the exclusion of low income housing by the white beneficiaries of
the urban renewal plan foreseeable? Was the segregative impact of the urban
renewal plan in Rizzo inevitable?
72. Resident Advisory Board v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435
U.S. 908 (1978).
73. See, e.g., Smith v. Town of Clarkton, 682 F.2d 1055, 1058–59, 1065–66 (4th
Cir. 1982) (upholding a district court ruling in favor of plaintiffs under the disparate
impact theory where town officials withdrew from a multi-municipality housing
authority, effectively blocking construction of fifty units of public housing that had
been approved for a virtually all-white town).
74. 844 F.2d 926 (2d Cir.), aff’d per curiam, 488 U.S. 15 (1988).
75. Id. at 928.
76. Id. at 930–31.
77. Id. at 938. The court found that, compared with whites, a greater percentage
within the minority community was income-eligible for subsidized housing. Id. The
court also noted that minorities were disproportionately represented on waiting lists
for subsidized housing units and certificates. Id. In addition, the court found that
the town’s zoning scheme and refusal to rezone “perpetuated segregation in the
Town.” Id. at 937–38.
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found the justifications offered by the town “insubstantial.”78 The
court then directed the district court to order the town to rezone the
plaintiff’s proposed site to allow for multi-family development and
remove the zoning barrier limiting private development of multifamily housing to the urban renewal area.79 The Supreme Court
affirmed that part of the judgment implicating its mandatory
jurisdiction, that is, the invalidation of the zoning ordinance,
“without endorsing the precise analysis” of the Second Circuit.80
In the 1990s, in Jackson v. Okaloosa County,81 the Eleventh Circuit
reversed the dismissal of an FHA disparate impact claim challenging
a policy that imposed special approval requirements for any public
housing project sited in an unincorporated five-mile area of the
county.82 A public housing applicant and a resident had challenged
the policy as excluding public housing from a predominantly white
area and concentrating that housing in one predominantly AfricanAmerican neighborhood; the plaintiffs alleged disparate impact on
African-Americans because they comprised 86% of the public
housing waiting list.83 The Eleventh Circuit held that the “action
should not have been dismissed on the pleadings.”84
A more recent, vivid example of the use of disparate impact theory
to challenge housing barrier regulations involves the post-Katrina
zoning activity of St. Bernard Parish, a suburban parish of New
Orleans that experienced total devastation following Hurricane
Katrina.85 Following the storm in 2005, St. Bernard Parish established
a variety of restrictions on multi-family housing development and
single-family rentals, including a measure restricting the rental of
single-family residences to blood relatives.86
Given the racial
78. Id. at 940.
79. Id. at 942.
80. See Huntington Branch, 488 U.S. at 18 (“[W]e note jurisdiction, but limit our
review to that portion of the case implicating our mandatory jurisdiction. Thus, we
expressly decline to review the judgment of the Court of Appeals insofar as it relates
to the refusal to rezone the project site.”).
81. 21 F.3d 1531 (11th Cir. 1994).
82. Id. at 1534–35.
83. Id. at 1542–43.
84. Id. at 1544.
85. See Stacy E. Seicshnaydre, How Government Housing Perpetuates Racial
Segregation: Lessons from Post-Katrina New Orleans, 60 CATH. U. L. REV. 661, 696–702
(2011) (describing the restrictive measures taken by St. Bernard Parish to
circumscribe its repopulation and redevelopment in the wake of Hurricane Katrina
and the subsequent legal challenges to such measures).
86. St. Bernard Parish, La., Ordinance SBPC #670-09-06 § I(A) (Sept. 19, 2006)
(prohibiting the rental of single-family residences “by any person or group of
persons, other than a family member(s) related by blood within the first, second or
third direct ascending or descending generation(s), without first obtaining a
Permissive Use Permit from the St. Bernard Parish Council”); St. Bernard Parish, La.,
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composition of the parish, which as of 2000 was 88.3% white and
7.6% black, and given the fact that white families owned 93% of all
owner-occupied houses in the parish, a single-family property owner
and a fair housing organization challenged the regulations, alleging
discriminatory intent and effect.87
With respect to the impact claim, the fair housing center argued
that the regulatory scheme in St. Bernard Parish made rental housing
unavailable to those who disproportionately needed that housing in
the New Orleans metropolitan area—blacks and Hispanics.88 The
plaintiffs also argued that the scheme “perpetuate[d] segregation by
preserving the Parish as an overwhelmingly all-white enclave.”89
Although the parties resolved the claims through a consent decree,
St. Bernard Parish subsequently enacted another moratorium on
multi-family housing developments consisting of five or more units.90
This prompted additional litigation by the fair housing center and a
developer seeking to build four mixed-income complexes of seventytwo units each.91 The developer anticipated that 50% of the residents
of the development would be black and that another 25% would be
comprised of other minority groups.92 The district court ruled in
favor of plaintiffs on both the intent and impact claims, finding
violations of the parties’ consent order and the Fair Housing Act.93
Ordinance SBPC #632-11-05 (Nov. 1, 2005) (establishing “a moratorium on the reestablishment and development of any multi-family dwellings in St. Bernard Parish
throughout the disaster recovery period”).
87. See Affidavit of Dr. Calvin P. Bradford at 5–6, Greater New Orleans Fair Hous.
Action Ctr. v. St. Bernard Parish, 641 F. Supp. 2d 563 (E.D. La. 2009) (No. 06-07185)
(establishing the racial composition and home ownership patterns of the parish
through the affidavit of a housing development expert); see also Amended Complaint
for Injunctive Relief, Declaratory Judgment, and Remedial Relief at 2, id. (No. 0607185) (alleging discriminatory intent and effect).
88. Amended Complaint, supra note 87, at 2–3.
89. Id. at 2.
90. Consent Order at 5–8, 11, Greater New Orleans Fair Hous. Action Ctr., 641 F.
Supp. 2d 563 (E.D. La. 2009) (No. 06-07185); St. Bernard Parish, La., Ordinance
SBPC #905-09-08 (Sept. 16, 2008).
91. Greater New Orleans Fair Hous. Action Ctr., 641 F. Supp. 2d at 566.
92. Id. at 568. The court found that income-qualified African American
households and families were at least 25%, and in some cases 86%, more likely to be
affected by the multi-family moratorium than Caucasian households and families. Id.
at 577–78.
93. Id. After the filing of at least five more motions for contempt, wherein the
housing developer and fair housing center challenged a variety of overt and covert
measures designed to block the development, and in light of the HUD’s threat to
withhold other funding, construction on the development proceeded. Seicshnaydre,
supra note 85, at 700–02. For additional description of the litigation challenging the
post-Katrina zoning regulation enacted in St. Bernard Parish, see id. at 696–704. The
Defendants filed notices of appeal throughout the district court proceedings; the
appeals are consolidated and pending in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
E.g., Greater New Orleans Fair Hous. Action Ctr. v. St. Bernard Parish, 641 F. Supp. 2d
563 (E.D. La. 2009), appeal docketed, No. 09-30134 (5th Cir. Feb. 26, 2009).
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Of course, the availability of the disparate impact theory in FHA
cases has not always resulted in relief for plaintiffs. As the Seventh
Circuit noted in Arlington Heights, “we refuse to conclude that every
action which produces discriminatory effects is illegal. Such a per se
rule would go beyond the intent of Congress and would lead courts
into untenable results in specific cases.”94
Plaintiffs bringing FHA disparate impact challenges to zoning
barriers have sometimes failed at the prima facie stage because of
thin proof of impact.95 In a 2007 FHA disparate impact challenge to
a cost-increasing regulation, for example, the Tenth Circuit affirmed
summary judgment based on the plaintiff’s insufficient showing that
the cost-increasing building regulation had a disparate impact on a
minority group because of that group’s lower income.96 Rather, the
Tenth Circuit ruled, plaintiff needed to make a specific showing as to
the amount of the increase, along with a showing “that this increase
disparately impacts the ability of members of the protected group to
buy a dwelling” as compared with non-protected group members.97
Aside from offering thin proof of impact generally, some
challenges to housing barriers have failed to demonstrate the
existence of a discriminatory barrier in the first place. In 2009 for
example, in Artisan/American Corp. v. City of Alvin,98 developers sought
to build two developments of thirty-six subsidized rental units in a city
near Houston that was asserted to be 45% Hispanic and to contain
most of the low-income housing in the county.99 The Fifth Circuit
affirmed summary judgment dismissing the developer’s disparate
impact challenge to a 300-foot separation requirement (between
apartment projects and single-family residential dwellings) because
the developer was unable to identify anyone affected by the denial of
his permit or show that a shortage of affordable housing actually
94. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1290
(7th Cir. 1977).
95. See, e.g., White Oak Prop. Dev., LLC v. Washington Twp., 606 F.3d 842, 851
(6th Cir. 2010) (affirming summary judgment and finding that the plaintiff
“presented no evidence . . . about the possible impact the prohibition on multifamily
dwellings would have on minority populations in the Township”); Greengael, LC v.
Bd. of Supervisors of Culpeper Cnty., No. 07-CV-00005, 2007 WL 2301570, at *3–4
(W.D. Va. Aug. 7, 2007) (granting summary judgment and finding “there are no facts
in the record which would indicate that the inability to construct multifamily homes
in the M-2 zone will disproportionately harm minorities”), aff’d per curiam, 313 F.
App’x. 577 (4th Cir. 2008).
96. See Reinhart v. Lincoln Cnty., 482 F.3d 1225, 1226, 1230–31 (10th Cir. 2007)
(affirming summary judgment dismissing disparate impact claim challenging land
use regulations for lack of proper prima facie proof).
97. Id. at 1230.
98. 588 F.3d 291 (5th Cir. 2009).
99. Id. at 294.
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existed.100 The plaintiff certainly could not show that the denial of
his permit to build subsidized housing furthered racial segregation,
or that his proposed development would help further the integration
purposes of the FHA. To the contrary, the Fifth Circuit noted that
additional low-income developments would actually further the
concentration of racial minorities in the city.101
Similarly, in Burrell v. City of Kankakee,102 the Seventh Circuit in 1987
affirmed a trial judgment dismissing an FHA disparate impact
challenge to a delay in processing section 8 Housing Assistance
Payment contracts.103 In addition to finding a lack of evidence of
discriminatory effect on availability of housing to minorities, the
court found that the delays stemmed from concern about the undue
concentration of assisted housing in the ward where plaintiff’s
properties were located.104
Thus, in the earliest FHA disparate impact cases and continuing
into more recent decades, plaintiffs have used the theory to challenge
barriers to the development of housing opportunities outside racially
segregated neighborhoods.
Courts have nevertheless imposed
rigorous prima facie proof requirements and have been less likely to
impose liability in cases where the effect of plaintiff’s barrier
challenge would be to increase segregation rather than eliminate it.
II. DISPARATE IMPACT CHALLENGES TO HOUSING IMPROVEMENT
REGULATIONS
Although the precise proof standards governing FHA disparate
impact challenges have varied,105 there is no disagreement among the
circuits as to the theory’s validity.106 The quiet, if muddled, landscape
on which the disparate impact theory has rested since shortly after
the passage of the FHA was disrupted by the Supreme Court’s
100. See id. at 295, 298–99 (noting that the concentration of low-income housing
in the city “suggest[s] that there is no shortage” (alteration in original)).
101. Id. at 299 n.20; see also Hallmark Developers, Inc. v. Fulton Cnty., 466 F.3d
1276, 1285, 1287 (11th Cir. 2006) (affirming post-trial judgment dismissing FHA
disparate impact challenge to refusal to rezone property for low income housing,
noting testimony that there was adequate housing for low and moderate income
residents and the property was located in an area already predominately populated
by minorities).
102. 815 F.2d 1127 (7th Cir. 1987).
103. Id. at 1130.
104. Id. at 1130–31.
105. See SCHWEMM & PRATT, supra note 1, at 21–26; see also id. at 21 (noting that
“few appellate decisions have carefully examined the burden of justification in a FHA
impact case, and these decisions reflect, accurately, that some issues have not been
authoritatively resolved”). But see infra Part IV (discussing HUD’s final rule setting
forth uniform standards for evaluating FHA disparate impact claims).
106. Supra notes 1–5 and accompanying text.
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decision in 2011 to grant certiorari in Magner v. Gallagher.107 In
Magner, the Eighth Circuit did not consider the more prevalent FHA
challenge to a housing barrier regulation, but rather reviewed
enforcement of a housing improvement regulation.108 In contrast to
the earlier discussion involving challenges to housing barrier
regulations, this section will begin with the most recent challenges to
housing improvement regulations and then consider the historical
treatment of these challenges by the lower courts.
A. Magner v. Gallagher
In Magner, the plaintiff owners (or former owners) of rental
property in St. Paul, Minnesota challenged the city’s housing code
enforcement scheme, which had been on the books since 1993, but
which the city began to enforce with vigor in 2002.109 The city
targeted rental properties for its enforcement efforts.110 The plaintiff
property owners rented primarily to low-income, rent-assisted
households, of which blacks made up a disproportionate
percentage.111 The property owners complained that the city’s
aggressive code enforcement tactics increased their costs of doing
business in the form of higher maintenance costs and fees.112 They
also claimed that the city’s enforcement efforts resulted in making
their properties unavailable through condemnations and forced
sales.113 The court listed the particular code violations that the city
cited against the plaintiffs, which included “rodent infestation,
missing dead-bolt locks, inadequate sanitation facilities, inadequate
heat, inoperable smoke detectors, broken or missing doors and
screens, and broken or missing guardrails or handrails.”114 The
plaintiffs did not challenge the city’s code standards as frivolous or
unnecessary. They instead argued that the city’s requirement that
they bring their substandard housing into compliance increased their

107. 132 S. Ct. 548 (2011) (granting petition for writ of certiorari to the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit).
108. See infra notes 116–118 and accompanying text (describing the appellants’
claim in Magner that the city’s enforcement of its housing code had a discriminatory
impact on the appellants’ tenants).
109. Gallagher v. Magner, 619 F.3d 823, 828–29 (8th Cir. 2010).
110. Id. at 829.
111. Id. at 830. The district court noted plaintiffs’ claim that between 60% and
70% of their tenant base was black. See Steinhauser v. City of St. Paul, 595 F. Supp.
2d 987, 995 (D. Minn. 2008) (reporting tenant demographics).
112. Magner, 619 F.3d at 830.
113. Id.
114. Id.
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costs, which resulted in a decrease in the amount of affordable
housing in the city.115
Significantly, St. Paul did not enact a housing ban against rental
properties or even target rental properties for demolition but rather
targeted rental properties for improvement.116 In arguing that the
housing improvement regulation made housing unavailable, the
property owners required the court to make an additional inferential
step between the regulation and the asserted impact.117 The court
concedes that the claim is indirect: the housing code enforcement
“burdened [the] Appellants’ rental businesses, which indirectly
burdened their tenants.”118 In deciding whether the plaintiffs
satisfied their prima facie burden of impact, the court could have
decided that the claim was too attenuated. Indeed, neither the
district court’s nor the Eighth Circuit’s opinion clarified whether the
property owners actually demonstrated the effect of the minimal
housing standards on their rental rates.
The idea that a landlord must from time to time reinvest some of
his or her rental proceeds for the purpose of property maintenance is
hardly novel.119 The fact that a majority of the plaintiffs’ tenants
received federal rental assistance suggests that the plaintiffs were not
only guaranteed rental payments from the government, but were also
receiving fair market rents as determined by HUD on an annual
basis.120 Housing code compliance could simply reduce plaintiffs’
profit margin, rather than necessitate a rental increase. Moreover,
any rental increase caused by compliance with the housing code
would not necessarily be unaffordable to all of plaintiffs’ tenants, nor
115. See id. at 834–35 (discussing the property owners’ argument that the city
experienced a shortage of affordable housing).
116. See id. at 829 (explaining the city’s goal of compelling property owners to take
more responsibility for their buildings or forcing changes in ownership).
117. Id. at 835 (“Though there is not a single document that connects the dots of
Appellants’ disparate impact claim, it is enough that each analytic step is reasonable
and supported by evidence.”).
118. Id.
119. See CHRISTOPHER LEE, NAT’L APARTMENT ASSOC., EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: 2013
SURVEY OF OPERATING INCOME & EXPENSES IN RENTAL APARTMENT COMMUNITIES 65,
available at http://www.naahq.org/sites/default/files/naa-documents/income-expenses
-survey/2013-Income-Expenses-Summary.pdf (discussing the increase of capital
expenditures for rental property in 2012 reflecting that deferred maintenance and
market competition required rental property upgrades).
120. Magner, 619 F.3d at 830; U.S. Housing Market Conditions Summary: Fair Market
Rents, U.S. DEP’T OF HOUSING & URB. DEV., http://www.huduser.org/periodicals/USHMC
/winter98/summary-2.html (last visited Nov. 27, 2013) (“For the Section 8 program
to work properly, certificate and voucher holders must have an adequate supply of
decent, safe, and sanitary rental units to choose from. Higher quality units
command higher rents, so FMRs must be sufficiently high to provide acceptable
choices for participants.”).
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would it have to be permanent. The plaintiffs did not appear to show
that strict enforcement of the housing code raised their costs to such
an extent that they could no longer rent their apartments at the
rental rates established by the government for subsidized housing.121
The court opinions do not indicate how many of the plaintiffs’ units
were removed from the city’s affordable housing inventory, despite
the plaintiffs’ allegations that some of the penalties included
condemnations and revoked rental registrations. Instead, the court
accepted the argument that a cost-increasing regulation that burdens
rental businesses (notwithstanding improving quality) resulted in a
per se decrease in affordable housing.122
The court suggested that there was more than one way to use
statistics to show impact,123 and this is certainly true. The notion that
a policy that bars or reduces affordable housing may have a
disproportionate effect on racial minorities is well established,124 but
the plaintiffs presented thin proof that the city’s code enforcement
regulation actually exacerbated an affordable housing shortage.125
Especially troubling is the failure of the court to consider the
implications of this aspect of its holding for the thousands of people
who must regularly trade quality for affordability. This is particularly
true for poor black renters using HUD rental assistance who
frequently live in worse or more segregated conditions compared

121. See LEE, supra note 119, at 67 (“Economic losses tend to be lower in
subsidized properties with their lower rents and relatively tight supply.”).
122. The court insists that it is requiring plaintiffs to demonstrate a causal link
between the defendant’s neutral policy and the shortage of affordable housing, see
Magner, 619 F.3d at 836 n.4, but this link is not apparent from the record. The court
merely maintains that the evidence shows that there was a shortage of affordable
housing and that the City’s “aggressive code enforcement exacerbated that
shortage.” Id. at 836.
123. Id. at 837.
124. See, e.g., supra notes 81–84 and accompanying text (discussing housing barrier
regulation that imposed special approval requirements for public housing
construction in predominantly white area of county).
125. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party
at 30, Magner v. Gallagher, 132 S. Ct. 1306 (2012) (No. 10-1032) (“[T]he court failed
to identify evidence adequately supporting a finding that the challenged
enforcement practices in fact caused any reduction in available affordable
housing.”). Plaintiffs attempted to link the city’s aggressive enforcement practices
and the loss of affordable units by offering a Vacant Buildings Report, which showed
an increase from 367 to 1466 in vacant homes over a nearly five year period. Magner,
619 F.3d at 835. However, the district court noted that the report attributed the
increase in vacant buildings to foreclosures stemming from other economic factors,
not from code enforcement. Steinhauser v. City of St. Paul, 595 F. Supp. 2d 987, 998
(D. Minn. 2008).
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with similarly situated whites using the assistance and compared with
blacks not using any assistance at all.126
There is no doubt that societal norms regarding minimal housing
standards have changed and will continue to change.127 Although
safe and sanitary features such as adequate heat, locks, handrails,
smoke detectors, and the absence of rats might have once been
considered luxuries, the City of St. Paul has determined that these
features are now necessities.128 The idea that the business model of
the subsidized plaintiff landlords precluded their provision of these
features to the minority tenants who disproportionately rented from
them is difficult to fathom. The idea that the government is willing
to subsidize property owners at fair market rates even when they fail
to provide such basic features is even more galling. Given the
absence of any proof demonstrating that the government-established
rents that most of the plaintiff landlords were receiving were not
sufficient to pay for handrails and smoke detectors, the plaintiffs’
prima facie showing was lacking.
Admittedly, the court noted that in many instances the city cited
between ten and twenty-five violations per property and that some
plaintiffs owned over forty properties.129 The cumulative nature of
the violations, then, could have imposed significant expenditures that
the plaintiffs could not make all at once.130 Yet, is the (federally
subsidized) plaintiff landowner who maintains dozens of properties
in substandard condition more aggrieved or simply more derelict? In
essence, the plaintiffs were operating under a more lenient
enforcement regime, and then that regime changed. However, the
standards themselves do not appear to have changed. This is the
aspect of the plaintiffs’ claim that pushes the envelope.
In
126. See Elizabeth Julian & Michael M. Daniel, HUD-Assisted Low-Income Housing: Is
It Working and for Whom?, POVERTY & RACE, July–Aug. 2009, at 3, 6–7 (analyzing a
HUD study entitled Characteristics of HUD-Assisted Renters and Their Units in 2003,
which used 2003 American Housing Survey data matched with HUD rental-assistance
data and included demographic data for hundreds of units, projects and
neighborhood conditions).
127. See City of St. Louis v. Brune, 515 S.W.2d 471, 476–77 (Mo. 1974) (en banc)
(per curiam) (finding that the city ordinance requiring adjacent tub or shower
facilities in each dwelling unit, thus forbidding units serviced by hall shower, was
confiscatory as applied and violated the owner’s due process rights; enforcement of
the ordinance did not implicate public health concerns, rather it “involve[d] a
matter of inconvenience to those tenants who choose to pay a minimum rent in
return for incomplete facilities”).
128. Magner, 619 F.3d at 830 (detailing plaintiffs’ code violations).
129. Id.
130. See Brune, 515 S.W.2d at 475–76 (citing cases discussing confiscatory
nature of some housing code enforcement in relation to the market value of the
affected properties).
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challenging the City of St. Paul’s decision to enforce its housing code
more strictly on the basis that it increased costs, the plaintiff
landlords are essentially asserting—on behalf of their black tenants—
a right to live in substandard housing,131 which furthers neither the
antidiscrimination nor the integration purposes of the FHA. When
viewed against the plaintiffs’ lack of proof that the city’s standards
were unreasonable or were actually resulting in a demonstrable
(rather than speculative) loss of affordable housing, this claim
borders on the offensive. The FHA was certainly not enacted to
give an owner of a condemned unit, declared “unfit for
habitation,”132 the right to continue renting the condemned unit
to a desperate tenant. Nor was the FHA enacted to give lowincome persons of color an “equal opportunity” to live in ratinfested squalor.133
However, there is another aspect to plaintiffs’ disparate impact
claim that appears to drive the Eighth Circuit’s decision to reinstate
it. In addition to arguing that the city’s stricter enforcement
increased their costs, which by itself fails to engender much
sympathy, the plaintiff landlords challenged the city’s aggressive
tactics.134 They complained that “the City issued false Housing Code
violations and punished property owners without prior notification,
invitations to cooperate with [the city], or adequate time to remedy
Housing Code violations.”135 Plaintiffs essentially argued that the
purpose and effect of the aggressive code enforcement tactics was to
put them out of business rather than to achieve compliance with the
code. The plaintiffs’ suggestion that the city enforced the code with
131. See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON AND VICKI L. BEEN, LAND USE CONTROLS: CASES AND
MATERIALS 469 (3d. ed. 2005) (weighing the merits of housing code enforcement
against housing affordability and the welfare of poor households).
132. Steinhauser v. City of St. Paul, 595 F. Supp. 2d 987, 992 (D. Minn. 2008).
133. See Amicus Brief of the United States, supra note 125, at 31 (“[A]ggressive
enforcement of a housing code can lead to an increase in the availability of lowincome housing that meets minimal safety standards, thus potentially benefitting
groups who are disproportionately represented in low-income housing.”). This case
has a similar flavor to the use of the FHA disparate impact theory to challenge the
closure of a group home following investigation of child abuse complaints. See Omni
Behavioral Health v. Miller, 285 F.3d 646, 655–56 (8th Cir. 2002). No one wants to
diminish group home options for children of color with special needs, but the FHA
was not enacted to provide group home operators immunity from investigation
because of the status of their residents. And the FHA was certainly not enacted to
facilitate the abuse of disabled children of color. The Eighth Circuit affirmed
summary judgment dismissing the FHA claim, which was a hybrid intent and effects
claim. Id. Of course, evidence of targeted enforcement based on race and lack of
probable cause might support a claim of disparate treatment.
134. Magner, 619 F.3d at 838 (“Appellants complain about how the City enforced
the Housing Code-not just the code’s standards and requirements.”).
135. Id. at 834.
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particular vigor against protected groups is essentially a disparate
treatment claim, which may not have been adequately developed in
the lower court and may have been mislabeled as a disparate impact
claim.136 This claim has some support in the record based on
statements demonstrating the city’s desire to reduce the number of
low-income tenants living in the city.137
Of particular importance, the Eighth Circuit did not rule for
plaintiffs on the merits. The court merely decided that the plaintiff
landlords satisfied their prima facie burden. The court remanded on
the alternative district court ruling that plaintiffs did not, at the
summary judgment stage, satisfy their final burden of offering “‘a
viable alternative that satisfies the [City’s] legitimate policy objectives
while reducing the . . . discriminatory impact’ of the City’s code
enforcement practices.”138 The court found that a genuine issue of
fact existed as to whether the city’s former code enforcement
program was a viable alternative, given that it “generated a
cooperative relationship with property owners, achieved greater code
compliance, and resulted in less financial burdens on rental property
owners,” which presumably then resulted in the maintenance of “a
consistent supply of affordable housing.”139 Thus, the most generous
reading of the plaintiffs’ allegations, which requires some parsing of
the opinion, is that the city’s tactics, not increased costs, were
preventing the plaintiff landlords from achieving compliance with
the city’s housing code. An alternative program focused on achieving
compliance, rather than putting landlords out of business, they
argue, would better accomplish the city’s legitimate objectives while
reducing any discriminatory impact.140
136. The district court found that much of the plaintiffs’ disparate impact
argument in the briefs was centered on the city’s targeting of the landlords for
enforcement on the basis of the race of their tenants. Steinhauser, 595 F. Supp. 2d at
997 n.5. The court properly identified this as an intent claim and analyzed it as such.
Id.
After concluding that plaintiffs did not assert a claim of intentional
discrimination based on circumstantial evidence, the court considered the plaintiffs’
direct evidence of discrimination and found that it did not establish a claim of
disparate treatment. Id. at 1000, 1005–06. The Eighth Circuit upheld the district
court’s dismissal of plaintiffs’ disparate treatment claims. Magner, 619 F.3d at 833.
137. Magner, 619 F.3d at 832.
138. Id. at 837 (alterations in original) (quoting Darst-Webbe Tenant Ass’n Bd. v.
St. Louis Hous. Auth., 417 F.3d 898, 906 (8th Cir. 2005)).
139. Id. at 838. At the district court level, the plaintiffs argued that the city could
achieve its objectives by adopting the federal Housing Quality Standard (HQS), but
the court found that plaintiffs did not meet their burden in support of this
alternative or demonstrate that HQS would have a lesser impact on rents, low-income
housing, or a protected class. See Steinhauser, 595 F. Supp. 2d at 999 (determining
that adopting HQS would not be a less discriminatory alternative).
140. See Magner, 619 F.3d at 838 (characterizing the alternative program as
successful at addressing and eliminating complaints against participating landlords).
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Given that the Eighth Circuit’s decision still required the plaintiff
landlords to prove their allegations at trial, it is curious that the
Supreme Court decided to grant certiorari on a reversal of summary
judgment.141 It is possible that the city would have prevailed after
trial. In any event, the city decided to withdraw the appeal following
the completion of all briefing in the case and shortly before oral
argument.142 Resolution of the impact standard under the FHA
would have to wait for another day.
B. Township of Mount Holly v. Mt. Holly Gardens Citizens in
Action, Inc.
It was not long before the Court would be presented another
opportunity to review the FHA disparate impact standard, again in
the housing improvement context. In June 2012, the Township of
Mount Holly, New Jersey filed a petition for certiorari challenging the
Third Circuit’s reversal of summary judgment on a disparate impact
challenge to a housing improvement plan.143 The township sought to
redevelop a thirty-acre neighborhood called “the Gardens,” which
was the only predominantly minority neighborhood it had.144 After
several iterations, the township’s redevelopment plan required the
demolition of the existing 329 market rate homes that were
affordable to its low and moderate income residents and replacement
with 464 more expensive market-rate units and fifty-six affordable
units.145 The existing units housed both renters and homeowners,
and the structures were mostly two-story row houses of eight to
ten units.146
A residents’ association and twenty-three current and former
residents challenged the redevelopment first in state court, which
found no violations of state law and the anti-discrimination claims

141. See infra Part II.D. (offering evidence that most cases concerning disparate
impact challenges to housing improvement plans are dismissed before trial and that
the summary judgment reversals in Magner and Mount Holly were anomalous).
142. Magner v. Gallagher, 132 S. Ct. 1306 (2012) (dismissing certiorari pursuant
to Rule 46.1 of the Rules of the Supreme Court).
143. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 1, Twp. of Mount Holly v. Mt. Holly Gardens
Citizens in Action, Inc., No. 11-1507 (June 11, 2012) [hereinafter Mount Holly Cert.
Petition]. The petition sought review of the decision in Mt. Holly Gardens Citizens in
Action, Inc. v. Township of Mount Holly, 658 F.3d 375, 377, 382 (3d Cir. 2011), which
held that the plaintiffs’ statistical submission demonstrating that the township’s
redevelopment plan had a disparate impact on minorities should have survived
summary judgment.
144. Mount Holly, 658 F.3d at 377.
145. Id. at 378–79.
146. Id. at 378.
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unripe.147 The plaintiffs then filed in federal court alleging, among
other things, that the redevelopment plan had a disparate impact on
African American and Hispanic persons.148 The plaintiffs alleged that
African Americans were eight times more likely to be affected by the
redevelopment than were whites, and Hispanics were eleven times
more likely to be affected.149 The parties particularly disputed who
would be eligible to return to the development, with plaintiffs
claiming 21% of African-American and Hispanic households in the
county as eligible compared to 79% of whites.150 The district court
considered the absolute number of African American and Hispanic
residents in the county who could afford to return, which far
exceeded the number of replacement units at the Gardens, rather
than using proportional statistics to compare the impact of
redevelopment on various groups.151
The Third Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of summary
judgment for the township.152 The court held that the district court
erred in rejecting plaintiffs’ proportional statistical submissions,
which it reasoned should have been reviewed in the light most
favorable to them.153 The court acknowledged that the district court
was grappling with a “valid and practical concern,” namely, the
consequences of upholding a disparate impact challenge to a housing
redevelopment plan, which could “render the Township powerless to
rehabilitate its blighted neighborhoods.”154 The court recognized,
however, that there was ample precedent to uphold the particular
method the plaintiffs selected to meet their prima facie burden.155
The court rejected the notion that perpetuation of segregation is the
only method of proving impact,156 and the court seemed constrained
to rule that a redevelopment plan targeted at the town’s only
147. Id. at 380.
148. Id. at 380–82. The plaintiffs also alleged that the redevelopment plan was
undertaken with discriminatory intent, but the Third Circuit upheld the district
court’s dismissal of that claim. Id. at 387.
149. Id. at 382. The plaintiffs argued, using 2000 census data, that 22.54% of all
African-American residents and 32.31% of all Hispanic households in Mt. Holly
would be affected by the demolitions, whereas only 2.73% of white households would
be affected. Id.
150. Id. at 382.
151. Id. at 383.
152. Id. at 377.
153. Id. at 382. The Third Circuit also noted the district court’s error in requiring
a showing that all minorities were treated differently than all whites, a showing
applicable to disparate treatment cases, not disparate impact cases. See id. at 383.
154. Id. at 385.
155. Id. at 382 (citing Keith v. Volpe, 858 F.2d 467, 484 (9th Cir. 1988); Huntington
Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926, 929 (2d Cir. 1988)).
156. Id. at 385.

SEICSHNAYDRE.OFF.TO.WEBSITE (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

IS DISPARATE IMPACT HAVING ANY IMPACT?

1/9/2014 3:50 PM

383

predominantly minority neighborhood was bound to have a
disproportionate impact on them as a group.157 Rather than avoiding
perverse results by straining to block plaintiffs’ prima facie case, the
court found that the “inquiry must continue.”158
Similar to Magner, no one disagreed that the township had a
legitimate interest in alleviating blight.159 The battleground in Mount
Holly, other than the prima facie showing of impact, was whether that
interest could be achieved in a way that would not displace residents
involuntarily from their homes and price them out of their
neighborhood and indeed the town.160 Frequently in disparate
impact cases challenging housing improvement plans, the battle is
over whether and how units can be rehabilitated rather than
demolished.161 Not surprisingly, the plaintiffs’ expert indicated that
remediation did not require “wholesale destruction,” and suggested
alternatives that included staged rehabilitation.162 Because the
township offered evidence that rehabilitation was not economically
feasible, the court found that a factual issue did exist as to whether
the defendant had met its initial burden of showing that there were
no less discriminatory alternatives to its redevelopment plan.163
157. Id. at 382.
158. Id. at 385. The court, having earlier accused the district court of conflating
the disparate treatment and impact standards, followed suit in its discussion of the
necessity of a “searching inquiry into the motives behind a contested policy to ensure
that it is not improper.” Id. The court further explained that the prima facie case
does not establish liability, but “simply results in a more searching inquiry into the
defendant’s motivations—precisely the sort of inquiry required to ensure that the
government does not deprive people of housing ‘because of race.’” Id. At the same
time, the court noted that the “[e]ffect, not motivation, is the touchstone.” Id. It
is possible that the court is concerned about the motivation behind the
redevelopment plan and is allowing use of the disparate impact theory to
“smok[e] out subtle or underlying forms of intentional discrimination.” Id.
(quoting Christine Jolls, Commentary, Antidiscrimination and Accommodation, 115
HARV. L. REV. 642, 652 (2001)).
159. Id. at 385.
160. See id. at 379 (describing resident fears of displacement and inability to
afford a home in the Gardens or anywhere else in the town); see also id. at 383
(noting that residents claimed even the affordable units would be out of reach
for most Gardens residents).
161. See, e.g., Charleston Hous. Auth. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 419 F.3d 729, 734
(8th Cir. 2005) (asserting that the housing authority’s plan to revitalize through
demolition would create a disparate impact on racial minorities).
162. Mount Holly, 658 F.3d at 386–87.
163. Id. at 387. The court articulated the township’s proof as requiring a showing
that the alternatives proposed an undue hardship. See id. at 386. In HUD’s disparate
impact regulation, promulgated after the Third Circuit’s decision in Mount Holly,
plaintiffs, rather than defendants, will have the burden of proving that a less
discriminatory alternative to the challenged practice exists that will serve the
defendant’s interests. See 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(c)(3) (2013) (indicating that a plaintiff
may prevail even if the defendant meets his or her burden of proof if the plaintiff
can demonstrate that the defendant’s legitimate interests can be served by a practice
with less discriminatory effect).
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Neither the Magner nor the Mount Holly circuit courts, therefore, in
reversing the district court’s dismissal of plaintiffs’ disparate impact
claims, entered a final judgment in favor of plaintiffs. They simply
allowed the cases to proceed to trial, finding that plaintiffs met
their prima facie burden and created a fact issue on the question
of whether there were less discriminatory alternatives to the
defendants’ methods of improving housing conditions in the
relevant communities.
The Supreme Court granted Mount Holly’s petition for the
purpose of deciding whether the disparate impact theory was
cognizable under the FHA.164 Before oral argument, the case was
resolved and the petition withdrawn.165
C. Charleston Housing Authority v. U.S. Department of Agriculture
In the only other successful FHA disparate impact challenge to a
housing improvement plan found at the appellate level, the Eighth
Circuit considered whether the demolition of housing predominantly
occupied by minority groups constituted a violation of the FHA. In
2005, in Charleston Housing Authority v. U.S. Department of Agriculture,166
the housing authority sought to revitalize through the demolition of a
fifty-unit public housing development occupied almost entirely by
African Americans.167 Current and former residents along with a
non-profit organization challenged the demolition alleging a
disparate impact based on race.168 In ruling for plaintiffs following
trial, the district court found that the demolition plan did have a
disparate impact in violation of the FHA, ultimately ordering the
housing authority to reopen the apartment complex and give priority
to former residents.169 The Eighth Circuit upheld the district court’s
finding that plaintiffs satisfied their prima facie burden, whether
based on the waiting list population, the income-eligible population,
164. Twp. of Mount Holly v. Mt. Holly Gardens Citizens in Action, Inc., 133 S. Ct.
2824 (2013) (granting petition for writ of certiorari to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit), cert. dismissed, No. 11-1507, 2013 WL 6050174 (Nov. 15, 2013);
Mount Holly Cert. Petition, supra note 143, at i.
165. Mount Holly, 2013 WL 6050174 (Nov. 15, 2013) (dismissing certiorari
pursuant to Rule 46.1 of the Rules of the Supreme Court).
166. 419 F.3d 729 (8th Cir. 2005).
167. Id. at 733.
168. Id. at 734. In an aspect of the case not relevant here, the housing authority
filed a separate action against the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) that was
consolidated with the fair housing case, in which it sought to remove statutory and
contractual restrictions requiring it to operate the property as public housing. Id. at
733–34. The USDA had helped finance the renovation of the property in 1981. Id.
at 733.
169. Id. at 736–37.
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or the population of actual apartment tenants.170 The court
considered the housing authority’s purported justification of
reducing the concentration of low-income housing. While noting
that density reduction was a legitimate goal recognized by Congress,
the Eighth Circuit upheld the district court’s factual finding that the
housing authority failed to demonstrate the need for deconcentration in the circumstances of the case.171 In a very
significant final turn, however, the court refused to affirm the district
court’s order requiring that the apartments be reopened for
occupancy, and instead remanded to the district court for it to hold
an evidentiary hearing on “current conditions at the apartments and
evidence regarding proposals for redevelopment.”172 Despite holding
that the demolition plan had a disparate impact on African-American
tenants, the Eighth Circuit recognized that the passage of time might
have “materially change[d] circumstances” so that an alternative to
re-occupancy might “affirmatively further fair housing in a more
positive fashion.”173 Thus, although the court’s opinion left the
door open to possible re-occupancy, it is not clear that the
plaintiff’s successful showing of disparate impact would block the
demolition.
Charleston Housing Authority demonstrates the need for a factintensive inquiry in challenges to housing improvement regulations
to ensure that the purposes of the FHA are furthered by the
challenge. Even though the circuit court agreed that the demolition
plan would have a racially disparate impact, it was not willing to grant
the relief the plaintiffs requested. In cases challenging demolition of
housing overwhelmingly occupied by minorities, prima facie proof of
impact may be straightforward.174 The purported justifications based
170. Id. at 741.
171. Id. at 742. The district court had blended the burdens in its disparate impact
analysis by characterizing the defendant housing authority’s justifications as
“pretextual”—an analysis more appropriate in a disparate treatment case. See id. at
741 (reviewing the district court’s factual determinations on the Housing Authority’s
justifications). Such discussion of pretext is unnecessary because, if a defendant is
unable to support its purported justifications with sufficient evidence, as the housing
authority was in this case, then it will hardly be able to demonstrate a “manifest
relationship” between the proposed action and the justification, or that the proposed
action is “necessary” to achieve its objectives. See id. at 741 (setting forth defendant’s
disparate impact burden of proof in the Eighth Circuit).
172. Id. at 742–43.
173. Id. at 742.
174. But see Anderson v. Jackson, No. 06-3298, 2007 WL 458232, *1, *9 (E.D. La.
Feb. 6, 2007) (explaining that proposed public housing demolition plans where
100% of the population is African American do not per se create adverse
impact. The plaintiffs must provide supporting evidence that the plan caused a
“statistical disparity between the African-American residents and non-protected
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on the revitalization of blighted housing may also be straightforward.
However, as more fully explored in Part IV, the circuit court
understood that FHA disparate impact theory can and should be
focused on whether a less discriminatory alternative to wholesale
demolition is available that does not maintain the status quo of
racially segregated, substandard housing.175
What is misleading in the discussion of all three of these cases and
what may be escaping the Supreme Court is that historically, plaintiffs
have been terrifically unsuccessful at the appellate level in disparate
impact challenges to housing improvement plans. In fact, with the
exceptions of Magner, Mount Holly, and Charleston Housing Authority,
plaintiffs have failed in every other appeal involving an FHA disparate
impact challenge to a housing improvement plan, as set forth in the
next subsection.
D. Unsuccessful Housing Improvement Cases at the Appellate Level
The recent string of successes in the ability of FHA disparate
impact plaintiffs to survive summary judgment or preserve post-trial
judgments in challenges to housing improvement plans is not
representative of the forty-year history of the FHA.176
More
particularly, FHA disparate impact challenges to the enforcement of
housing codes against property owners based on theories similar to
those urged in Magner have been unsuccessful on appeal. In 2009, in
Bonasera v. City of Norcross,177 the Eleventh Circuit affirmed summary
judgment dismissing an Hispanic homeowner’s disparate impact
challenge to a city’s enforcement of a single-family zoning ordinance
against her.178 The plaintiff alleged that the city selectively enforced
its ordinance against her because she rented rooms to Hispanic
persons in a white neighborhood.179 Although the plaintiff brought
intent and effects claims, she appeared to conflate the theories in
arguing that the city’s selective enforcement, which would by
definition be influenced by some consideration of race or national

individuals” or “evidence to support their claim that the proposed demolition plans
perpetuate segregation”).
175. See Charleston, 419 F.3d at 742 (directing the district court to consider
“alternative proposals for revitalization . . . that will affirmatively further fair housing
in a more positive fashion than reoccupancy of the existing apartments”).
176. See infra Part III (analyzing FHA disparate impact theory cases at the
appellate level, showing that over the forty-year history, many more cases than
not end negatively for plaintiffs).
177. 342 F. App’x 581 (11th Cir. 2009) (per curiam).
178. Id. at 586.
179. Id. at 583.
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origin, had a disparate impact.180 Ultimately, the appellate court
rejected both claims and found that the plaintiff presented no
evidence that the enforcement of the ordinance had an impact on
the city’s Hispanic population generally.181
Other noteworthy cases illustrate the difficulty of challenging code
enforcement schemes using disparate impact theory. In 1999, in
Catanzaro v. Weiden,182 a plaintiff challenged the decision of
Middletown, New York to demolish two of his buildings (each
containing eight low-income apartments) almost immediately
following their damage in a car accident; plaintiff’s theory was that
the city engaged in a “calculated campaign” to drive out minorities by
On panel
making low-income housing units unavailable.183
rehearing, the Second Circuit noted that the plaintiffs were
challenging the demolition of two buildings, not the city’s overall
housing policy.184 The court affirmed summary judgment for
defendant and held the evidence insufficient to demonstrate that any
housing policies had a discriminatory effect or that the demolitions
were part of discriminatory housing policies.185 In 1994, in Armendariz
v. Penman,186 the Ninth Circuit considered evidence that “a significant
number of minorities were impacted” by code enforcement sweeps
closing low-income housing units in the Arden-Guthrie
neighborhood of the City of San Bernardino, but found the evidence
insufficient to avoid summary judgment dismissal of the FHA claim.187
Again, in arguing that the city’s decision to target a particular
neighborhood for code enforcement sweeps had a disparate racial
impact, plaintiffs failed to challenge the code enforcement scheme
generally or provide any racial data for neighborhoods not selected
for the sweeps.188

180. See id. at 585–86 (explaining that the use of disparate impact evidence in a
selective enforcement case might more appropriately be used to provide
circumstantial evidence of discriminatory intent).
181. Id. at 586.
182. 188 F.3d 56 (2d Cir. 1999).
183. Id. at 58–60.
184. Id. at 65.
185. Id.
186. 31 F.3d 860 (9th Cir. 1994) (granting summary judgment to defendants on
plaintiffs’ FHA claim), aff’d in part, vacated in part en banc, 75 F.3d 1311 (9th Cir.
1996) (upholding panel dismissal of FHA disparate impact claim). The defendants
in this case raised qualified immunity defenses that entitled them to an interlocutory
appeal of the district court’s denial of summary judgment; the Ninth Circuit reversed
the denial. Id. at 863.
187. Id. at 868–69.
188. Id. The court also noted the absence of any allegation of discriminatory
intent in the targeting of the Arden-Guthrie neighborhood. Id. at 869.
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Another case challenging the targeting of neighborhoods for
aggressive code enforcement illustrates the importance of developing
a strong record of disparate treatment in such cases. In 2006, in 2922
Sherman Avenue Tenants’ Ass’n v. District of Columbia,189 several tenant
groups challenged the targeting of Hispanic neighborhoods for
housing code enforcement, which resulted in the closure of certain
buildings.190 The D.C. Circuit set aside the jury verdict in favor of
plaintiffs on the disparate impact claim, but remanded so that the
jury could be instructed on the disparate treatment claim.191 The
D.C. Circuit found that the plaintiffs did not present sufficient
evidence of the national origin of the tenants actually residing in the
properties targeted for aggressive code enforcement, which was
necessary to show actual impact.192 However, the court found that the
plaintiffs had made a sufficient record on the claim that the District
of Columbia intentionally selected some buildings and excluded
others on the basis of the national origin of neighborhood
residents.193 The District’s initial “Hot Properties” list consisted of
seventy-five buildings evenly distributed throughout the District, but
their final list included twenty-seven buildings “located in
neighborhoods with an average percentage of Hispanic residents 4.1
times as great as the percentage of Hispanics in the city as a whole.”194
This case demonstrates how the discriminatory effects of a code
enforcement scheme can establish disparate treatment on a welldeveloped record that includes other circumstantial evidence of
neighborhood targeting.
Thus, many of the disparate impact challenges to housing codes
discussed in this Part, including that in Magner, demonstrate the
danger of relying too heavily on disparate impact theory to do the
work of what is essentially a disparate treatment claim. These
challenges centered not on the housing codes themselves, but on the
targeting of the codes against certain neighborhoods and the
enforcement of the codes against plaintiffs to achieve racially
discriminatory objectives. The more isolated and targeted the code
enforcement action, the more appropriate a disparate treatment
challenge.
However, a proper disparate impact claim can
nevertheless be made, in addition or in the alternative, if the
challenge is to a generalized plan of aggressive code enforcement
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.

444 F.3d 673 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
Id. at 676.
Id. at 676–77.
Id. at 680–81.
Id. at 684.
Id. at 682.
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that is race-neutral, but has the effect of removing or displacing
persons of color at a disproportionate rate from a certain
neighborhood or jurisdiction.
Plaintiffs bringing FHA disparate impact challenges to enjoin
private landlords from displacing tenants in the course of housing
rehabilitation activities have also met with limited success. In 1989, in
Gomez v. Chody,195 residents of a five-building apartment complex
consisting of seventy-three units challenged the manner of their
displacement from the apartments during rehabilitation.196 The
residents, 95% of whom were Hispanic, alleged that 60% of the city’s
Hispanic residents resided at the complex.197 The Seventh Circuit
affirmed summary judgment, finding this evidence insufficient to
establish liability given that the entire complex had been declared a
public nuisance and unfit for human habitation, effectively displacing
every resident of the building.198 Also important to the court was the
fact that the rehabilitation plan “was designed to benefit persons of
low to moderate income” and not “a device, intentional or otherwise,
to force Hispanics out of Wood Dale.”199 Rather than demolishing
the units, the plan would result in rehabilitating them, with 51% of
the apartments occupied by low- or moderate-income persons; this
could in theory allow displaced residents to return to the complex.200
In a similar case decided in 2007, Bonvillian v. Lawler-Wood Housing,
LLC,201 tenants challenged the closing of a single apartment building
for renovation following Hurricane Katrina, arguing that a majority
of the affected residents were disabled and members of minority
groups.202 The Fifth Circuit affirmed summary judgment dismissing
the disparate impact claim, finding that because the building was
closed to all tenants, all were equally affected with no disparate
impact on protected class members.203
Plaintiffs seeking to enjoin housing authorities in their efforts to
rehabilitate and revitalize public housing also have had considerable
difficulty. In 2005, for example, in Darst-Webbe Tenant Ass’n Board v.

195. 867 F.2d 395 (7th Cir. 1989).
196. Id. at 397.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 397, 402. The record revealed that “[t]he apartments were in an
advanced state of dangerous disrepair, unsanitary, and infested with insects and
rodents.” Id. at 397.
199. Id. at 403.
200. Id. at 401.
201. 242 F. App’x 159 (5th Cir. 2007) (per curiam).
202. Id. at 160.
203. Id.
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St. Louis Housing Authority,204 plaintiff tenant associations challenged
public housing revitalization plans that sought to reduce the density
of public housing units and replace them with a mix of subsidized
and market rate rental and homeownership units.205 The plaintiffs
argued that the housing authority should provide 120 more public
housing units on or off site than were being planned.206 On review of
a bench trial decision, the Eighth Circuit assumed that the plaintiffs
established a prima facie case; the development was racially
segregated, with 220 family public housing units occupied almost
entirely by African Americans.207
After finding the housing
authority’s objectives of de-concentration to be legitimate and facially
neutral, however, the court found that the plaintiff offered no
evidence that its alternative housing mix could accomplish
defendants’ objectives with less discriminatory effect.208
A qualitative examination of FHA disparate impact challenges to
housing improvement plans and regulations at the appellate level
therefore reveals that these claims are frequently dismissed before
trial, the dismissals are upheld, plaintiffs face difficulty on the claims
in the rare trials that do occur, and appellate courts have no trouble
affirming the plaintiffs’ trial defeats and reversing their trial wins.209
The summary judgment reversals for plaintiffs in Magner and Mount
204. 417 F.3d 898 (8th Cir. 2005).
205. Id. at 900.
206. Id. at 901.
207. Id. at 900, 902. Other courts have refused to find a prima facie case in a
challenge made to the demolition of public housing where virtually all of the
residents displaced by a revitalization plan are African American. See, e.g., Anderson
v. Jackson, No. 06-3298, 2007 WL 458232, at *1, *9 (E.D. La. 2007) (finding prima
facie evidence insufficient where plaintiffs failed to show that the proposed
demolition of four of New Orleans’ largest public housing developments following
Hurricane Katrina caused a statistical disparity between the residents who were
virtually all African American and any non-protected individuals).
208. Darst-Webbe, 417 F.3d at 903, 906; see also id. at 904 (“We . . . do not sit as a
secondary legislative body to amend or rework funding and planning decisions based
on our own, alternative predictive judgments about the likely success of alternative
proposed actions.”).
209. Of course, this analysis does not capture the cases that are resolved through
settlement, cases which may present the strongest prima facie showing of impact.
For example, in Hispanics United of DuPage County v. Village of Addison, the district
court recounted the parties’ disparate impact arguments in conducting a fairness
hearing on a negotiated consent decree in a case challenging a redevelopment plan.
988 F. Supp. 1130 (N.D. Ill. 1997). The court noted the strength of the plaintiffs’
showing of impact:
Over 49% of the TIF district residents are Hispanic, while their Village-wide
population is just 13.4%. The districts also contain the two largest Hispanic
neighborhoods—in fact the only two majority Hispanic areas—in the Village.
Moreover, almost 44% of the Village’s entire Hispanic population resides in
these two districts.
Id. at 1155.
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Holly, while apparently sufficient to capture the attention of the high
Court, are aberrational.
A quantitative analysis of how FHA disparate impact claims have
fared over their forty-year history is offered next to shed additional
light on how the appellate courts have struck the balance in disparate
impact cases generally, and in housing barrier and housing
improvement cases specifically.
III. A QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF FORTY YEARS OF FHA DISPARATE
IMPACT CASES AT THE APPELLATE LEVEL
Over the past forty years, courts have had ample opportunity to
define the limits of the disparate impact theory in the context of the
FHA. For purposes of this section, the analysis includes all of the
disparate impact claims brought under the Fair Housing Act210 and
actually considered by an appellate court211 in the more than forty
years212 since the disparate impact standard was recognized for Title
VII by the Supreme Court in 1971.213 After eliminating those cases
where the appellate court did not reach the disparate impact claim
on procedural grounds,214 or because the case was essentially decided
on disparate treatment grounds,215 ninety-two pertinent cases remain
210. This Article does not consider disparate impact claims challenging
discriminatory housing policies where the Fair Housing Act claim may or may not
have been made but the court ruled on other grounds, such as under the Equal
Protection Clause. See, e.g., United Farmworkers of Fla. Hous. Project, Inc. v. City of
Delray Beach, 493 F.2d 799, 811 n.12 (5th Cir. 1974) (declining to reach the FHA
disparate impact housing claim after ruling on the claim under the Equal Protection
Clause); see also Acevedo v. Nassau Cnty., 500 F.2d 1078, 1081 (2d Cir. 1974) (ruling
on a disparate impact housing claim made under the Equal Protection Clause).
211. For an example of a case that was excluded because the court did not
reach the disparate impact claim, see Bloch v. Frischholz, 587 F.3d 771, 784 (7th
Cir. 2009), in which the court declined to reach disparate impact theory argued
on appeal because it was not briefed or considered by the district court in
summary judgment proceedings.
212. The analysis spanned from 1974, when the first disparate impact FHA case
was decided, United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1974), until
June 30, 2013.
213. See generally Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (recognizing a
discriminatory effects standard in employment discrimination cases brought under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
214. See, e.g., In re Countrywide Fin. Corp. Mortg. Lending Practices Litig., 708
F.3d 704, 705 (6th Cir. 2013) (affirming denial of class certification on disparate
impact claim challenging delegation of discretion to local mortgage brokers on loan
pricing policies); NAACP v. City of Kyle, 626 F.3d 233, 235 (5th Cir. 2010) (affirming
denial of relief under FHA on other grounds, namely, based on lack of standing).
215. There is a case worth mentioning that evaded the Westlaw search because it
was decided in 1974, after the Supreme Court adopted the disparate impact theory
in Griggs, but before courts were regularly using terms such as “disparate impact” and
“discriminatory effects”. The case, Williams v. Matthews Co., 499 F.2d 819 (8th Cir.
1974), is for all intents and purposes a disparate treatment case, but the court used
Griggs and the “fair in form, [but] discriminatory in operation” language to close off
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and are set forth in the Appendices.216 The analysis focuses on
appellate cases, rather than on district court cases or settlements,
both because of the accessibility of the data and because of the
unique role played by appellate courts in shaping doctrine and
controlling for perverse outcomes. The analysis does not address
how the litigants fared on any other claim they might have brought
under the FHA or on any other constitutional or statutory grounds.
First, this section discusses the outcomes in FHA disparate impact
cases at the appellate level by decade, type of outcome, whether
occurring pre-trial or post-trial, and rate of affirmance. Second, this
section provides an analysis of plaintiff and defendant outcomes at
the appellate level by type of case, particularly with respect to housing
barrier and housing improvement challenges.
A. Party Outcomes in FHA Disparate Impact Cases, 1974–2013
Litigants have attempted to use the disparate impact theory in
varied housing transactions, on behalf of varied protected classes, and
in varied contexts. Few litigants have the resources to hire an expert
to develop the kind of statistical analysis often important to establish
a prima facie case of disparate impact.217 Many claims are dismissed
every possible escape route for a real estate developer who seems to have charmed
his way out of liability at trial. Id. at 827 n.9, 828. The development company used a
purportedly neutral policy as a non-discriminatory reason for refusing to sell a lot in
an all-white subdivision to an African American family. Id. at 828. The policy, a
requirement that lots be sold only to approved contractors, apparently was not
applied to whites, was used as a delaying tactic, resulted in none of the approved
contractors agreeing to sell to the plaintiff, and helped the developer stall in
response to inquiries made by the only contractor who would work with the plaintiff,
who was African American. Id. at 828 & n.10. The court reversed a bench trial
decision in favor of defendant, primarily finding that the evidence established a
prima facie case and the defendant’s policy both “carried racial overtones” and could
not constitute a business necessity because it discriminated “in operation” and rested
upon “pure chimera.” Id. at 828.
216. Applied Westlaw search using the search terms: disp! discrim! /2 impact!
effect! & “fair housing act” FHA 3604. The search was over-inclusive by design
because there was no reliable way to use Westlaw headnotes or summaries to narrow
the search without excluding pertinent cases. Of the 278-case yield of appellate
cases, the appellate courts reached the disparate impact FHA claim in ninety-two
cases. The analysis includes all pertinent cases yielded in the search, whether
“reported” or “unreported.” If the case generated multiple appellate decisions on its
path to final resolution, it was not counted twice unless the multiple decisions dealt
with wholly distinct disparate impact FHA claims.
217. See, e.g., Susan D. Carle, A Social Movement History of Title VII Disparate Impact
Analysis, 63 FLA. L. REV. 251, 257 (2011) (“It is today very rare for plaintiffs other than
highly sophisticated and well-funded litigants, such as the U.S. Department of Justice,
to prevail under Title VII on a disparate impact theory.”); Stacy E. Seicshnaydre, Is
the Road to Disparate Impact Paved with Good Intentions?: Stuck on State of Mind in
Antidiscrimination Law, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1141, 1147 n.31 (2007) (citing
supporting case law where the litigant was unable to demonstrate a prima facie case
due to a lack of statistical evidence).
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at the summary judgment stage for this reason.218 As discussed above,
some litigants tack on a disparate impact claim as added insurance
when they are concerned about the strength of their intent
evidence.219 As a result, some of these claims fail because they are
inapplicable to the facts and are not well-developed.220
What is abundantly clear when analyzing the FHA disparate impact
case law over the past forty years is that the appellate courts have had
little difficulty disposing of all manner of disparate impact claims
under the FHA. As shown in Figure 6, plaintiffs have received
positive decisions221 in less than 20%, or eighteen of the ninety-two
When
FHA disparate impact claims considered on appeal.222
considering these results over four decades, it is apparent that the
successes are concentrated in the 1970s and 1980s, with the rate of
success for FHA disparate impact plaintiffs dropping in each decade
thereafter. To illustrate, all three of the FHA disparate impact cases
considered by appellate courts in the 1970s resulted in positive
decisions for plaintiffs. This perfect success rate (based on an
admittedly small number of cases) dipped in the 1980s, although
plaintiffs obtained positive decisions in 47% of cases, or seven out of
fifteen, where FHA disparate impact claims were considered on
appeal. In the 1990s, plaintiffs’ rate of success dropped further to
13%, with only three out of twenty-three appellate cases resulting in a
positive decision for plaintiffs on the FHA disparate impact claim. In

218. See infra Figure 4.
219. See Seicshnaydre, supra note 217, at 1147–49 (discussing how some plaintiffs
bring disparate impact claims because of the notion that they are easier to prove
than disparate treatment claims).
220. This Article does not purport to explain the reason for plaintiffs’ low win rate
generally. In the employment context, some commentators have offered an antiplaintiff attitudinal explanation for the differential reversal rates favoring defendants
at the appellate level. E.g., Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, Employment
Discrimination Plaintiffs in Federal Court: From Bad to Worse?, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV.
103, 104–05 (2009). Authors Clermont and Schwab also provide a refutation of the
anti-plaintiff effect as reflecting weak cases that are presented ineffectively and
appealed too often. Id. at 114 n.34.
221. Cf. Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Do Case Outcomes Really Reveal
Anything About the Legal System? Win Rates and Removal Jurisdiction, 83 CORNELL L. REV.
581, 581 (1998) (“‘[W]in rates’ are probably the slipperiest of all judicial data. Win
rates are inherently ambiguous because of the case-selection effect . . . [which]
produces a biased sample from the mass of underlying disputes.”).
222. In the analogous context of employment discrimination appeals, plaintiffs
appear to obtain positive outcomes in 15% of all their cases, including appeals of
both pretrial and trial adjudications. See Clermont & Schwab, supra note 220, at 110
(extrapolated from Display 2 using the reversal rates indicated for both plaintiffs and
defendants yielding a calculation of 2073 positive outcomes for plaintiffs over 13,902
total appeals). At the federal district court level, over the period of 1979-2006, “the
plaintiff win rate for jobs cases (15%) was much lower than that for non-jobs cases
(51%).” Id. at 127.
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the 2000s, plaintiffs’ success rate dropped still further to 8.3%, with
three out of thirty-six appellate cases resulting in positive decisions
for plaintiffs. Thus far in the current decade, plaintiffs have obtained
positive outcomes in only two appellate cases, and the Supreme Court
has granted certiorari in both of them, while defendants have
obtained positive decisions in thirteen cases. Although the rate of
FHA disparate impact appeals has increased in each decade since the
1970s, these increases have not resulted in a very large absolute
number of cases for reviewing courts to consider, and the rate of
increase in the current decade is thus far below that of the 2000s.223
Further, despite the increase in appeals relating to FHA disparate
impact claims, plaintiffs’ success rate is decreasing, with only a
handful of cases each decade resulting in positive outcomes for
plaintiffs. These outcomes by decade are illustrated in Figure 1.
Figure 1: FHA Disparate Impact Decisions on Appeal
Party Outcomes by Decade
33
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0
1970s

1980s

Decade

It is also instructive to consider the nature of these eighteen
“positive outcomes” for plaintiffs. Figure 2 reveals that not every
positive decision represents a final disposition on the merits. Only
nine cases, or half, involved review of final trial dispositions. Five
223. Three and one-half years into the current decade, reviewing courts have
considered fifteen FHA disparate impact claims, which if the pattern continues,
would result in forty-three total cases with FHA disparate impact claims on appeal in
this decade. This represents an increase of 19% from last decade. The previous
decade saw an increase of appeals from twenty-three in the 1990s to thirty-six in the
2000s, or 56.5%.
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cases affirmed a bench trial decision for plaintiff and four reversed a
negative bench trial decision against plaintiff. Four decisions merely
reversed the dismissal of an FHA disparate impact claim at the
pleading stage.
One decision recognized and delineated the
disparate impact standard to be applied in FHA cases and remanded
for the lower court to reach the merits. Four cases reversed a
dismissal of the FHA disparate impact claim on summary judgment.
Figure 2: FHA Disparate Impact Appellate Decisions—18 Positive Outcomes
for Plaintiffs, 1974–2013
Reversing
Bench Trial
Decision, 4

Affirming
Bench Trial
Decision, 5

Reversing
Dismissal of/
Recognizing
Claim, 5

Reversing
Summary
Judgment, 4

With respect to the total of four decisions reversing the dismissal of
FHA disparate impact claims on summary judgment, Figure 3
demonstrates that two of these occurred this decade, in 2010 and
2011, with the Supreme Court granting a writ of certiorari in each.
Thus, prior to the Supreme Court’s recent willingness to grant
certiorari to review the question whether the disparate impact theory
of liability should apply under the FHA, only two appellate courts in
forty years ever reversed the dismissal of plaintiffs’ FHA disparate
impact claims on summary judgment. This happened once in the
late 1980s and once again twenty years later in the 2000s, as shown in
Figure 3. This compares to thirty-nine affirmances of summary
judgments dismissing FHA disparate impact claims, one reversal of a
denial of summary judgment for defendant, three reversals of
summary judgments granted in plaintiffs’ favor, and a refusal to
instruct the jury on disparate impact. In sum, and as revealed in
Figure 4, plaintiffs’ overall success rate on appeals of summary
judgments in the FHA disparate impact context is four of forty-eight
cases, less than 10% and less than the overall success rate of FHA
disparate impact plaintiffs.
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Figure 3: FHA Disparate Impact Appellate Decisions—18 Positive Decisions
for Plaintiffs
Moreover, the two positive decisions before 2010 reversing
summary judgment dismissals of FHA disparate impact claims are
limited. The first case, Doe v. City of Butler,224 decided in 1989, cannot
even fairly be described as a reversal. The Third Circuit actually
affirmed summary judgment on the claim before it, a sex-based FHA
disparate impact challenge by domestic violence victims to an
ordinance limiting the number of occupants in transitional
dwellings.225 The positive outcome consisted of the Third Circuit’s
remand to consider whether the challenged ordinance had a
disparate impact on the basis of familial status, a newly protected
category under the FHA that Congress added after the district court
had ruled.226 The second case, Committee Concerning Community
Improvement v. City of Modesto,227 decided in 2009, involved four
predominantly Latino neighborhoods outside the city of Modesto
that challenged the city’s and county’s failure to annex them into the

224.
225.
226.
227.

892 F.2d 315 (3d Cir. 1989).
Id. at 323.
Id. at 323–24.
583 F.3d 690 (9th Cir. 2009).
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city and otherwise provide adequate municipal services.228 The
positive outcome in this case was technically a reversal of the earlier
dismissal of the FHA claim made at the pleading stage, although the
Ninth Circuit restored only part of the FHA claim based on summary
judgment evidence of impact considered in the context of other
The appellate court found the summary judgment
claims.229
disparate impact evidence insufficient to support a claim relating to
the provision of sewer services, but sufficient to support a claim
relating to the provision of law-enforcement personnel.230
Thus, the two “reversals” of summary judgment dismissals of FHA
disparate impact claims prior to 2010 are not sweeping victories for
plaintiffs. Rather, one has to parse these opinions carefully to
identify the disparate impact slivers that survive dismissal. Also,
neither of these reversals involved a challenge to a housing
improvement plan.
Figure 4: FHA Disparate Impact Pre-trial Decisions on Appeal, 1974–2013
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In addition to summary judgment affirmances, Figure 4
demonstrates defendants’ rate of affirmance for dismissals of
plaintiffs’ FHA disparate impact claims, with defendants obtaining
eight affirmances and plaintiffs obtaining five reversals of complaint
228. Id. at 696.
229. Id. at 699–700, 714–15. The Ninth Circuit restored the FHA claim after
concluding, contrary to the district court, that the FHA did apply to discrimination
occurring after the acquisition of housing. Id. at 714.
230. Id. at 714–15.
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dismissals.231 Further, defendants were able to have two denials of
preliminary injunction motions affirmed, and one disparate impact
finding for plaintiff reversed at the preliminary injunction stage.
When considering post-trial decisions on appeal, Figure 5
demonstrates that plaintiffs and defendants are about even with
respect to their ability to obtain positive outcomes following bench
trials, with plaintiffs able to affirm five positive and reverse four
negative FHA disparate impact bench trial decisions. Defendants
were able to affirm nine positive and reverse one negative FHA
disparate impact bench trial decisions. Defendants were also able to
reverse two HUD administrative law judge (“ALJ”) decisions and one
HUD Secretary decision. Plaintiffs obtained no positive outcomes on
appeal with respect to jury verdicts, whereas defendants were able to
have three positive jury verdicts affirmed and three negative jury
verdicts reversed, as shown in Figure 5.
Figure 5: FHA Disparate Impact Post-Trial Decisions on Appeal, 1974–2013
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Next, as shown in Figure 6, when considering the affirmance rates
for plaintiffs and defendants generally, the data shows that
defendants were able to affirm positive decisions obtained in the
lower courts in sixty-two of seventy-four cases, or 83.8% of the time.
231. Included in the category of plaintiff reversals and other on complaint
dismissals is the Seventh Circuit’s decision on remand in Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v.
Vill. of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1288–90 (7th Cir. 1977) (finding that a
showing of discriminatory effects could state a claim under the FHA).
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The affirmance rate generally for federal civil appeals is thought to
be about 80%.232 By contrast, plaintiffs were able to have positive
results obtained in the lower courts affirmed in only six of eighteen
cases, or 33.3% of the time. Thus, plaintiffs in FHA disparate impact
cases fared far worse than average when considering the generally
high rate of affirmance in federal civil appeals, while defendants
enjoyed an affirmance rate that was better than average. Stated
another way, defendants were able to have 66.7% of plaintiffs’
positive decisions on FHA disparate impact claims reversed, while
plaintiffs were able to reverse only 16.2% of defendants’ positive
decisions on these claims.
Figure 6: FHA Disparate Impact Outcomes on Appeal, 1974–2013

Reversal Rate

Affirmance Rate

TOTAL OUTCOMES

Pro-Defendant
Outcomes on Appeal

Pro-Plaintiff Outcomes
on Appeal

66.7%

16.2%

(12/18 lower court wins
for plaintiff reversed)

(12/74 lower court wins
for defendant reversed)

83.8%

33.3%

(62/74 lower court wins
for defendant affirmed)

(6/18 lower court wins
for plaintiff affirmed)

80.4%

19.6%

(74/92 CASES)

(18/92 CASES)

Whatever has prompted the Court’s sudden interest in examining
the question of disparate impact liability under the FHA, this interest
cannot be attributable to plaintiffs’ high rate of success or the
appellate courts’ general unwillingness to impose a rigorous and
exacting review of the claims at every stage of the proceedings.
B. Data by FHA Disparate Impact Case Type: Housing Barrier and
Housing Improvement Cases
Based on the data analysis below, there appears to be a discernible
difference in the way the appellate courts have reviewed challenges to
“housing barrier” regulations as opposed to “housing improvement”
plans and regulations.
In the ninety-two appellate decisions
considering FHA disparate impact challenges, nineteen cases dealt
232. See Clermont and Schwab, supra note 220, at 106 (comparing plaintiffs’
win rates generally to win rates in jobs cases in district and appellate courts from
1979 to 2006).
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with housing barrier rules and fourteen challenged housing
improvement or redevelopment plans. Another fourteen challenged
policies or regulations on the basis of disparate impact against
persons with disabilities.233 Although not all disparate impact claims
center on these case types, these were the three most common FHA
disparate impact challenges reviewed by the appellate courts, as
reflected in Figure 7.234
Figure 7: FHA Disparate Impact Appeals by Case Type, 1974–2013
Municipal Other, 8
Services, 3

Housing
Barrier, 19

Condo, 4
Housing
Authority, 5
Lending, 5
Familial Status,
10
Rental Policies,
10

Housing
Improvement,
14

People with
Disabilities, 14

Comparing the rates of success of the housing barrier and housing
improvement challenges at the appellate level, the housing barrier
challenges were twice as successful. As reflected in Figure 8, the
housing barrier disparate impact challenges were successful 42% of
the time (eight of nineteen cases), whereas the housing improvement
disparate impact challenges were successful 21% of the time (three of
233. Even though the disability-based challenges can be described as seeking to
overcome “barriers” for persons with disabilities, they are not included with the
“barrier” cases because of the distinct statutory requirements at issue in these cases,
such as the requirement that housing providers make “reasonable accommodations
in rules, policies, practices, or services, when such accommodations may be necessary
to afford such person equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.” 42 U.S.C.
§ 3604(f)(3)(B).
234. As illustrated in Figure 7 and Appendix B, the remainder of the ninety-two
FHA disparate impact challenges include ten involving various challenges to rental
policies and practices; ten involving challenges to occupancy restrictions or other
rules on the basis of familial status; five involving lending and appraisal practices;
another five involving housing authority policies; four involving housing cooperative
and condominium rules; and three involving a city’s failure to maintain or provide
municipal services to property. Eight additional appeals in Figure 7 are included
under the category of “other” (highway site selection, city and state funding
priorities, steering, and housing advertising restrictions).

SEICSHNAYDRE.OFF.TO.WEBSITE (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

1/9/2014 3:50 PM

IS DISPARATE IMPACT HAVING ANY IMPACT?

401

fourteen cases). Thus, plaintiffs challenging housing improvement
regulations are achieving the same rate of success as are FHA
disparate impact plaintiffs on average. On the other hand, plaintiffs
challenging housing barrier regulations are twice as successful as
FHA disparate impact plaintiffs on average.235
Figure 8: FHA Disparate Impact Outcomes on Appeal by Case Type,
1974–2013
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The Magner and Mount Holly decisions comprise two of the three
positive decisions in the housing improvement context. Stated
another way, before 2011 when the Court decided to review the
disparate impact standard under the FHA, only one FHA disparate
impact challenge to housing improvement plans had resulted in a
positive outcome for plaintiffs at the appellate level. This is Charleston
Housing Authority, discussed in Part II.236
When shifting focus to examine the type of cases comprising the
body of appellate case law resulting in positive decisions for plaintiffs,

235. See supra notes 221–222 and accompanying text (explaining win rates
generally and positive outcomes specifically for disparate impact claims on appeal);
see supra Figure 6 (showing that FHA disparate impact outcomes on appeal were
successful 19.6% of the time).
236. See supra Figure 8; see also supra notes 170–173 and accompanying text
(explaining the Eighth Circuit decision to uphold the district court’s finding that the
housing authority’s demolition plan had a racially disparate impact, and remanding
for the district court to identify an alternative to the proposed re-occupancy that
would further fair housing).
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which constitutes eighteen of ninety-two cases,237 the most successful
claims brought by plaintiffs were housing barrier claims. Eight of the
eighteen, or 44.4% of all positive FHA disparate impact decisions at
the appellate level were challenges to housing barriers. The next
most successful type of claim among the positive outcomes for
plaintiffs were challenges to neutral occupancy rules or other
restrictions on the basis of familial status, at five of the eighteen,
or 27.8%.
Only three cases out of the eighteen positive decisions, or 16.7%,
involved challenges to housing improvement plans. These results are
reflected in Figure 9.
Figure 9: FHA Disparate Impact—Distribution of 18 Positive Outcomes for
Plaintiffs on Appeal by Case Type, 1974–2013
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Services
Rental Policy (5.55%), 1, 6%
(5.55%), 1, 5%
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(16.7%), 3,
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These data show that the predominant type of FHA disparate
impact claim on appeal and also the predominant type of claim on
which plaintiffs are receiving positive outcomes at the appellate level
is the housing barrier claim. Thus, to the extent that appellate courts
have had forty years to oversee the application of disparate impact
theory in FHA cases, they have been far more receptive to housing
barrier claims than housing improvement claims.
Following the filing of the certiorari petition in Magner, but before
the filing of the petition in Mount Holly, the federal agency with
authority to interpret the FHA decided to weigh in.238 The next Part
237. See supra Part III.A (discussing the eighteen positive decisions for plaintiffs in
FHA disparate impact appeals).
238. See 42 U.S.C. § 3608(a) (assigning the authority and responsibility of
administering the FHA to the Secretary of the HUD); id. § 3608(e) (delineating the
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analyzes HUD’s disparate impact rule and how it might apply to
housing improvement challenges.
IV. HUD’S DISPARATE IMPACT RULE AND ITS APPLICATION TO
HOUSING IMPROVEMENT CASES
Despite the unanimity among the circuits that a disparate impact
method of proof is cognizable under the FHA, a number of different
standards have proliferated over the past four decades.239 The
petitions for certiorari in both Magner and Mount Holly raised the
question of which test should govern review of FHA disparate impact
cases.240 In November 2011, between the filing of the two certiorari
petitions, HUD issued a proposed rule interpreting the disparate
impact standard in FHA cases.241 On February 15, 2013, after the
Mount Holly petition was filed, but before it was granted, HUD issued
its Final Rule, entitled “Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s
Discriminatory Effects Standard.”242 HUD issued its rule after
decades of adopting and applying the disparate impact standard in
formal adjudications, policy statements, and guidance to its staff.243
In addition to recognizing the validity of a disparate impact
approach in FHA cases, HUD’s disparate impact rule sets forth the
parties’ burdens and the burden-shifting framework to be applied.244
In doing so, HUD opted for the burden shifting approach over the

functions of the Secretary in performing this responsibility); id. § 3614a (“The
Secretary may make rules . . . to carry out this subchapter.”).
239. For example, some courts apply a burden-shifting framework similar to that
applied in Title VII cases, whereas other courts apply a four-factor balancing test.
Compare Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926, 938–39
(2d Cir.) (applying burden-shifting approach), aff’d per curiam, 488 U.S. 15 (1988),
with Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1290 (7th
Cir. 1977) (applying four-factor balancing test). See generally SCHWEMM & PRATT, supra
note 1, at 21 (noting “that only a few appellate decisions have carefully examined the
burden of justification in a FHA impact case, and these decisions reflect, accurately,
that some issues have not been authoritatively resolved”).
240. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Magner v. Gallagher, 132 S. Ct. 1306
(2011) (No. 10-1032) (asking, if disparate claims are indeed cognizable under the
Fair Housing Act, whether they should “be analyzed under the burden shifting
approach used by three circuits, under the balancing test used by four circuits, under
a hybrid approach used by two circuits, or by some other test”); see also Mount Holly
Cert. Petition, supra note 143, at i (same).
241. Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects Standard,
76 Fed. Reg. 70,921 (proposed Nov. 16, 2011) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. pt. 100).
242. Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects Standard,
78 Fed. Reg. 11,460 (Feb. 15, 2013) (codified in 24 C.F.R. pt. 100).
243. See id. at 11,461–62 (discussing how HUD has consistently interpreted the
disparate impact standard throughout its FHA enforcement history).
244. Id. at 11,479.
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four-factor balancing test.245 The plaintiff bears the burden of
proving its prima facie case by showing “that a challenged practice
caused or predictably will cause a discriminatory effect.”246
Discriminatory effect is defined as a practice that “actually or
predictably results in a disparate impact on a group of persons or
creates, increases, reinforces, or perpetuates segregated housing
patterns because of race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial
status, or national origin.”247 Once the plaintiff meets its prima facie
burden, the defendant has “the burden of proving that the
challenged practice is necessary to achieve one or more substantial,
legitimate, nondiscriminatory interests of the respondent or
defendant.”248 If the defendant meets its burden of justification, the
“plaintiff may still prevail upon proving that the substantial,
legitimate, nondiscriminatory interests supporting the challenged
practice could be served by another practice that has a less
discriminatory effect.”249
HUD emphasizes in its preamble to the Final Rule that “HUD is
not proposing new law in this area.”250 In particular, HUD’s rule does
not create a new standard on plaintiff’s prima facie burden other
than “that a challenged practice caused or predictably will cause a
discriminatory effect.”251 As the review of the case law in Part II
demonstrates, a prima facie showing of disparate impact is not as
easily made in a housing improvement case as might be expected.252
Except in the rare instances where courts assumed that the prima
facie case was made, they often rejected plaintiffs’ prima facie
evidence in both code enforcement and revitalization cases because it
was limited to the group disproportionately affected by the housing

245. See id. at 11,463 (explaining that some courts have embraced a four-factor test
over the burden-shifting framework in FHA cases).
246. 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(c)(1) (2013).
247. Id. § 100.500(a).
248. Id. § 100.500(c)(2).
249. Id. § 100.500(c)(3).
250. Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects Standard,
78 Fed. Reg. at 11,462. HUD goes on to state that “this final rule embodies law that
has been in place for almost four decades and that has consistently been applied,
with minor variations, by HUD, the Justice Department and nine other federal
agencies, and federal courts.” Id.
251. 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(c)(1).
252. See supra Part II.D; see also Dana L. Miller, Comment, HOPE VI and Title VIII:
How a Justifying Government Purpose Can Overcome the Disparate Impact Problem, 47
ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1277, 1296 (2003) (noting that despite the likelihood that any
demolition and revitalization plan will have a disparate impact on public
housing occupants, who are overwhelmingly protected class members, “this fact
alone does not guarantee the plaintiff will be successful in making out a prima
facie case”).
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“improvement” plan.253 Many courts have found it insufficient to
show simply that those displaced by a plan or scheme are
predominantly or even exclusively members of minority groups.254
Plaintiffs must also show that the plan has a disproportionately lesser
impact on unprotected groups.255 HUD’s final regulation, which
does not alter the law on plaintiffs’ prima facie showing, would not
likely have altered any negative case outcomes in the housing
improvement arena.
Nor would HUD’s disparate impact rule necessarily have altered
the outcomes of Magner and Mount Holly at the circuit court level,
given that these cases turned, at least in part, on the question of
whether plaintiffs met their prima facie burdens. Further, the courts
found that plaintiffs created a fact issue on the burden HUD has now
placed with plaintiffs: whether an alternative exists that would
accomplish defendant’s legitimate interests with less discriminatory
effect.256 The Magner and Mount Holly decisions can be reconciled
with the greater number of plaintiff losses in housing improvement
cases at the appellate level. As an initial matter, the paucity of
successful outcomes for plaintiffs in housing improvement cases
undermines any suggestion that the FHA disparate impact standard is
regularly producing perverse outcomes. At the same time, summary
judgment will not always be an appropriate vehicle for resolving FHA
disparate impact challenges to housing improvement plans. In Gomez
v. Chody, the complex had been declared a public nuisance, so the
court showed little interest in examining impact.257 In other cases,
including Mount Holly, the degree of blight in a building,

253. See supra text accompanying notes 177–88 (reviewing cases where the
plaintiffs’ challenges to a city’s code enforcement scheme or redevelopment plan
failed because the plaintiffs did not show the impact on minorities in the
community generally).
254. Id.
255. See supra text accompanying notes 201– 03 (discussing how the dismissal of
the plaintiffs’ claims in Bonvillian v. Lawler-Wood Housing, LLC were affirmed because
the disputed action equally affected all parties with no disparate impact on protected
class members).
256. The Mount Holly court placed this final burden of proof on defendants, but
found that plaintiff had created a fact issue on whether an alternative to demolition
existed that would serve defendant’s interests with less discriminatory effect. See
supra note 163 and accompanying text. The Magner court placed the final burden on
plaintiff, consistent with HUD’s subsequently enacted regulation. See supra notes
138–39, 248-49 and accompanying text.
257. See supra note 198 and accompanying text (describing how the court in Gomez
affirmed summary judgment because liability could not be established when every
resident was displaced after the entire complex was declared a public nuisance and
unfit for human habitation).
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neighborhood, or town is a matter of considerable factual dispute.258
What should be done about that blight, namely, whether demolition
is justified, is a matter of even greater dispute. Allegations of
discriminatory targeting and intent also may need to be assessed. At
the heart of many housing improvement cases seems to be the notion
that towns manage blight differently—whether they realize it or not—
depending on the racial and ethnic makeup of those residing in
structures deemed blighted.259
Given the fact that housing
improvement plans have operated in particular cases to prevent the
return of minorities to the “improved” area, it is understandable for
residents targeted for displacement to view such plans with
skepticism.260 Community and neighborhood revitalization plans will
almost always be legitimate in the abstract, but whether they are
racially exclusionary will depend on the facts of a particular case.
Further complicating the picture in housing improvement cases is
the fact that HUD’s disparate impact regulation reflects the caselaw
defining discriminatory effect in more than one way. A plaintiff can
demonstrate discriminatory effects when the plan: 1) “actually or
predictably results in a disparate impact on a group of persons,” or 2)
258. See, e.g., Hispanics United of DuPage Cnty. v. Vill. of Addison, 988 F. Supp.
1130, 1152 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (“[T]he plaintiffs did not take issue with the general need
for redevelopment . . . . What they objected to was the Village’s aggressive manner of
redevelopment, which, plaintiffs claimed, was wholly unjustified given that these were
habitable buildings—buildings that had a lengthy future economic life, were
increasing in sales value, were licensed yearly as in compliance with the Housing
Code, and were no more densely situated than the average multi-family rental
structures in Addison.”); see also Miller, supra note 252, at 1306 (“[M]any maintain
that the [HOPE VI public housing revitalization] program has been broadly applied
to fund the demolition of units that are not truly distressed. For example, in areas
where gentrification has begun and a public housing site remains as the last ‘island
of affordability,’ there can be considerable pressure to use . . . grant money to reduce
the number of affordable units in the area while freeing up real estate for marketrate units.” (footnote omitted)).
259. See, e.g., Hispanics United, 988 F. Supp. at 1155 (“Further evidence of
discriminatory effect is found in the fact that the Village began [redevelopment]
activities in majority Hispanic areas, and never reached the vacant, deteriorating
commercial sites or predominantly non-minority sectors in the districts.”).
260. See id. at 1141 (noting that “[t]he Village did not discuss replacing any of the
units demolished or removed from the market in these neighborhoods with
affordable housing until after plaintiffs had filed suit”); Resident Advisory Bd. v.
Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126, 129–33 (3d Cir. 1977) (describing the refusal of a virtually all
white urban renewal community to accept the replacement low income housing that
was to be constructed in the community years after the low income residents, many
of whom were black or Hispanic, were displaced); see also Miller, supra note 252, at
1284 (“The fact that most public housing residents whose suffering justified the
revitalization activities do not return after the revitalization has been completed has
been widely recognized . . . .”); cf. Keith v. Volpe, 858 F.2d 467, 471, 484 (9th Cir.
1988) (affirming trial court injunction for residents displaced by a freeway
construction against city’s refusal to permit construction of replacement units;
plaintiffs demonstrated disparate impact under FHA based on fact that two-thirds of
those who would benefit from replacement housing were minorities).
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“creates, increases, reinforces, or perpetuates segregated housing
patterns” because of a protected category.261 The effect of a housing
improvement plan on segregated housing patterns may depend on
whether short-term or long-terms effects are evaluated. A housing
improvement plan may have an adverse impact on a community of
color in the immediate aftermath of its adoption and
implementation, but over time it may have the effect of increasing
housing opportunity and reducing segregation. On the other hand,
a housing improvement plan may purport to reduce segregation in a
generic or superficial way, but its implementation might achieve the
exact opposite effect and increase segregation because the plan lacks
any detailed mechanism for achieving its purported purpose. For
example, after displacement, minority residents of the area targeted
for “improvement” may relocate to other segregated neighborhoods
or may be excluded from the improved and integrated
neighborhood, as discussed above. Summary judgment will not be
appropriate if the plaintiff creates a fact issue on whether a housing
improvement plan sets the stage for exclusion and segregation.
In the end, an FHA disparate impact challenge to a housing
improvement plan or regulation must be framed by the purposes of
the statute and not merely to maintain the status quo of substandard
housing. The FHA is concerned with more than whether housing is
substandard and if it is, whether it must be demolished or whether it
can be rehabilitated. The FHA is concerned with opportunity, and
the fact that a plan results in the disproportionate displacement of
minorities does not reveal, by itself, the overall impact on housing
opportunity and segregation. HUD’s disparate impact rule can be
applied to ensure that the FHA’s purposes are achieved. For
example, the revitalization justification “must be supported by
evidence and may not be hypothetical or speculative.”262 This means
that a plan must provide sufficient detail so that its impact on
housing opportunity and integration may be ascertained.
If the challenged plan revitalizes housing while setting the stage for
exclusion and increased segregation, then the defendant’s
revitalization justification cannot be deemed legitimate and
nondiscriminatory as required under the rule, because it is serving as
a gateway to a housing barrier plan.263 On the other hand, if the
261. 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(a) (2013).
262. 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(b)(2) (2013).
263. See id. § 100.500(c)(2); see also Resident Advisory Bd., 564 F.2d at 133 (citing the
district court’s conclusion that “[t]he effect of these urban clearance actions by both
RDA and PHA appears to have converted an integrated area of Philadelphia into a
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housing improvement plan helps facilitate the purposes of the FHA,
such as creating more housing opportunity and integration, the
revitalization justification will be legitimate, and it will be more
difficult for the plaintiff to identify a less discriminatory alternative.
The question whether a less discriminatory alternative exists must
center on whether there is an alternative to the challenged housing
improvement plan that will both revitalize housing or neighborhoods
and increase housing opportunity and integration. HUD has now
placed this final, substantial burden on plaintiffs.
If history is any judge, most of these FHA housing improvement
challenges will continue to be dismissed on summary judgment. The
lower courts have demonstrated that they are more than capable of
applying a narrowly circumscribed FHA disparate impact standard.
However, in those cases where the defendants’ revitalization plans are
flimsy or plaintiffs can create a fact issue on less exclusionary
alternatives, a trial is a small price to pay for integration. Thus, the
FHA can serve as an important check on housing improvement plans
operating as the functional equivalent of housing barrier plans.
After HUD issued its final rule, the Solicitor General submitted a
brief in Mount Holly suggesting that review of the FHA disparate
impact standard was unwarranted because the appellate courts had
not yet had the opportunity to interpret HUD’s final rule.264 Further,
the Solicitor General suggested that the case was not a proper vehicle
for review of the disparate impact standard because the parties had
not pressed the issue in the lower courts and the appeal was
interlocutory, as the Third Circuit had merely reversed summary
judgment and remanded the case for trial.265 The Court granted
certiorari nonetheless on June 17, 2013 to decide the sole question of
whether disparate impact claims are cognizable under section 804(a)
of the FHA.266 Like Magner, the case resolved prior to oral argument,
again preventing Supreme Court review.267

non-integrated area” (quoting Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 425 F. Supp. 987, 1009
(E.D. Pa. 1976))).
264. Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae at 6, Twp. of Mount Holly v. Mt.
Holly Gardens Citizens in Action, Inc., No. 11-1507 (2013).
265. Id. at 21–22.
266. See Twp. of Mount Holly v. Mt. Holly Gardens Citizens In Action, Inc., 133
S. Ct. 2824 (2013) (granting petition for writ of certiorari to the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit), cert. dismissed, No. 11-1507, 2013 WL 6050174
(Nov. 15, 2013).
267. Mount Holly, 2013 WL 6050174 (Nov. 15, 2013) (dismissing certiorari
pursuant to Rule 46.1 of the Rules of the Supreme Court).
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V. WILL THE FHA DISPARATE IMPACT THEORY SURVIVE?
Assuming the Court continues to grant certiorari on the question,
it will likely engage in a statutory construction analysis to determine
the validity of the FHA disparate impact theory. The parties and
amici have covered and will continue to cover this subject extensively
in their briefs, and this Article does not seek to improve on their
analysis so much as provide a historical and contextual framework for
considering the FHA disparate impact theory. That said, this Article
offers the following brief observations.
The earliest circuit courts to adopt the disparate impact theory of
proof for FHA cases did not ignore issues of statutory construction.
They concluded that the “because of race” language of the FHA
could be satisfied by a showing of discriminatory effect without a
showing of discriminatory intent.268 In so doing, these courts and
those that followed considered the broad legislative purposes
underlying the FHA,269 judicial interpretations of analogous language
in Title VII,270 and the common sense notion that a party can
undertake an act “because of race” if “the natural and foreseeable
consequence of that act is to discriminate between races, regardless
of . . . intent.”271 The Court denied petitions for certiorari in three of
268. See, e.g., Resident Advisory Bd., 564 F.2d at 146–47 (analogizing to the statutory
text of Title VII and concluding that a prima facie case of liability can be made in
FHA cases on a showing of discriminatory effect); Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of
Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1288–90 (7th Cir. 1977) (finding, in the context of
a housing barrier regulation, that “a violation of section 3604(a) can be established
by a showing of discriminatory effect without a showing of discriminatory intent”); see
also Langlois v. Abington Hous. Auth., 207 F.3d 43, 49 (1st Cir. 2000) (citing
consensus of other circuit courts that the FHA can be violated by actions that have an
unjustified racial impact); United States v. City of Parma, 494 F. Supp. 1049, 1054–55
(N.D. Ohio 1980), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 661 F.2d 562 (6th Cir. 1981). The court
in City of Black Jack found that a prima facie case could be made on the basis of
discriminatory effects, meaning “that the conduct of the defendant actually or
predictably results in racial discrimination,” then on the facts of the case held
the City’s ordinance violated Title VIII because it denied persons housing “on
the basis of race.” United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179, 1184, 1188
(8th Cir. 1974).
269. E.g., Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926, 934–
39 (2d Cir.), aff’d per curiam, 488 U.S. 15 (1998); Resident Advisory Board, 564 F.2d at
147; Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d at 1289–90; City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d at 1184.
270. See, e.g., Huntington Branch, 844 F.2d at 934–35 (accepting the relevance of
Title VII and finding the disparate impact approach applicable to Title VIII cases);
Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d at 1288–89 (rejecting the argument that Congress
required a “more probing standard of review” for Title VII cases); Resident Advisory
Bd., 564 F.2d at 147 (noting that the same “because of race” language appears in
Title VII and does not require a showing of discriminatory intent); City of Black Jack,
508 F.2d at 1184 (noting that Congress requires the removal of racial barriers in the
employment context, so “such barriers must also give way in the field of housing”).
271. Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d at 1288; cf. Carle, supra note 217, at 286–87 (“The
idea that both invidious and neutral employment practices could cause
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the early cases to recognize disparate impact claims under the FHA.272
In another, Huntington, the Court affirmed part of the judgment
“[w]ithout endorsing the precise analysis” of the Second Circuit.273
Some courts also noted the Supreme Court’s acknowledgment on
several occasions that different proof standards applied to
constitutional and statutory civil rights claims.274
Although a
proliferation of standards emerged, no circuit split emerged in the
last forty years on the validity of FHA disparate impact theory.
Further, although Congress amended Title VII in 1991 to
incorporate
the
disparate
impact
standard,
it
neither
contemporaneously amended nor simultaneously considered the
FHA such that Congress can be presumed to have intentionally
omitted a disparate impact provision from the FHA.275 Moreover,
none of the judicially created, burden shifting methods of proof
generated over the history of Title VII and Title VIII can be found in
the text of the FHA.276 Though the FHA is clear that race (along with
other factors) is a prohibited basis for an action, it does not specify
any methods of proof.277 For example, the FHA has not been
amended to state that the burden-shifting approach set forth in
McDonnell Douglas for disparate treatment cases is the appropriate
discrimination was familiar to both public officials and activists seeking solutions to
structural racial subordination [in the period leading up to the Griggs decision].”).
272. See, e.g., Resident Advisory Bd., 564 F.2d 126 (housing barrier regulation), cert.
denied, 435 U.S. 908 (1978); Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283 (housing barrier
regulation), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1025 (1978); City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179
(housing barrier regulation), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1042 (1975).
273. Huntington Branch, 488 U.S. at 18.
274. For example, in Resident Advisory Board, the court noted the Supreme Court’s
observation in Washington v. Davis that the effects standard would have been proper
for a Title VII case but was insufficient to support a constitutional violation. Resident
Advisory Bd., 564 F.2d at 147 (citing Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 246–48
(1976)); accord Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d at 1288–89. Also, in Arlington Heights, the
Supreme Court remanded for the Seventh Circuit to consider the FHA claim after it
noted the constitutional claim must fail on the same evidence. Vill. of Arlington
Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977), remanded to 558 F.2d 1283;
see also Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d at 1287 (“[T]he Supreme Court’s decision does not
require us to change our previous conclusion that the Village’s action had a racially
discriminatory effect. What the Court held is that under the Equal Protection Clause
that conclusion is irrelevant.”).
275. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(2012); id. § 3604; cf. Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc.,
557 U.S. 167, 174–75 (2009) (refusing to apply Title VII’s mixed motive burdenshifting framework to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) because
Congress considered the two statutes simultaneously in 1991 and amended Title VII
to include a mixed motive framework while neglecting to include such a provision in
its contemporaneous amendments to the ADEA).
276. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–3619 (failing to mention or give any indication of a
burden-shifting framework suggested by the courts).
277. See, e.g., id. § 3604(a) (prohibiting any refusal to “sell or rent after the making
of a bona fide offer, or to refuse to negotiate for the sale or rental of, or otherwise
make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person because of race”).
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method of proving that an action was taken “because of race.”278 Yet,
all of the courts of appeal that have considered the question have
held that the McDonnell Douglas framework should also be available
under the FHA.279 To eliminate the disparate impact method of
proof borrowed from Title VII because it is not written into the
FHA, while accepting the other burden-shifting methods of proof
borrowed from Title VII, but absent from the FHA statutory text,
is disingenuous. 280
Finally, the Court held in 2005 that the disparate impact proof
standard was available in cases brought under the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act in large part because Justice Scalia wrote a
concurring opinion noting that EEOC regulations interpreted the
ADEA to include a disparate impact standard.281 HUD issued a
regulation in 2013 interpreting the FHA to include a disparate
impact standard, consistent with prior HUD regulations, guidance,
and administrative decisions.282 It remains to be seen whether Justice
Scalia will vote to uphold the disparate impact standard under the
FHA.283 It also remains to be seen whether the Court will select an
FHA case as a vehicle for applying Equal Protection analysis to quash
disparate impact liability against governmental entities, as more fully
explored below.
VI. SHOULD THE FHA DISPARATE IMPACT THEORY SURVIVE?
Following the qualitative and quantitative analysis set forth in this
paper, the question arises whether the FHA disparate impact theory
278. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 804 (1973)
(requiring a plaintiff in a Title VII claim to first establish his prima facie case, then
switching the burden to the defendant to provide a nondiscriminatory reason for
rejecting employment, which may then be rebutted by the plaintiff as pretext).
279. See SCHWEMM, supra note 12, § 10:2 (collecting cases); cf. Gross, 557 U.S. at 175
n.2 (2009) (noting that “the Court has not definitively decided whether the
evidentiary framework of [McDonnell Douglas] utilized in Title VII cases is appropriate
in the ADEA context”).
280. See Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926, 935
(2d Cir.) (“Courts and commentators have observed that the two statutes require
similar proof to establish a violation.”), aff’d per curiam, 488 U.S. 15 (1988).
281. Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 247 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment). Describing the case to be “an absolutely
classic case for deference to agency interpretation,” id. at 243, Justice Scalia went on
to find that “[t]he EEOC has express authority to promulgate rules and regulations
interpreting the ADEA. It has exercised that authority to recognize disparate-impact
claims. And, for the reasons given by the plurality opinion, its position is eminently
reasonable. In my view, that is sufficient to resolve this case.” Id. at 247.
282. Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects Standard,
78 Fed. Reg. 11,460 (Feb. 15, 2013) (codified in 24 C.F.R. pt. 100).
283. Justice Kennedy joined Justice O’Connor’s minority opinion (also joined by
Justice Thomas) that disparate impact claims were not cognizable under the ADEA.
Smith, 544 U.S. at 247–48 (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment).
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remains viable in the current era. What purpose does the theory
serve, given its relatively low rate of success, the expense and
expertise necessary to mount a successful disparate impact challenge,
its potentially perverse use in the context of housing improvement
plans, and the presumed availability of disparate treatment as an
alternative theory should the Court eliminate disparate impact?284
Despite the limitations of the theory, the disparate impact method
of proof remains a vital tool for accomplishing the elusive aims of
the FHA.
First, the theory’s limited success, undoubtedly because of the
confusion surrounding the theory and the expense involved in
establishing a prima facie case, is an inadequate reason to end the
theory.285 If anything, the inaccessibility of the claim for most
plaintiffs would seem to limit the number of claims and the judicial
resources required to be expended on them, should the Court be
concerned about that issue.286 In general, the number of FHA
administrative claims filed each year is a small fraction of the number
of employment claims filed annually.287 Given the unanimity in the
lower courts for many decades on the availability of the FHA
disparate impact standard, a decision by the Supreme Court
recognizing this standard is not likely to create a litigation explosion.
Second, there is no need for panic over the notion that community
revitalization plans and code enforcement schemes are subject to
challenge using the disparate impact method of proof. Of course,
284. See Michael Selmi, Was the Disparate Impact Theory a Mistake?, 53 UCLA L.
REV. 701, 701 (2006) (examining the limited success of the disparate impact
theory in the context of employment discrimination and arguing that “the theory
may have had the unintended effect of limiting our conception of intentional
discrimination”).
285. Cf. Carle, supra note 217, at 298 (“[L]itigation victories were not the only goal
of the activists who developed disparate impact doctrine. . . . Disparate impact
doctrine may be doing important legal work even without substantial numbers of
litigation victories because its purpose was and is to encourage employers to reflect
on the possible benefits of choosing employment selection processes that better
measure the elements of job performance needed for particular positions.”).
286. See Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2532 (2013)
(noting, after construing Title VII to require a more stringent standard of causation
for retaliation claims as opposed to status-based claims, the importance of its
interpretation to the “fair and responsible allocation of resources” because “claims of
retaliation are being made with ever-increasing frequency”).
287. HUD reports the filing of 10,242, 10,155, and 9354 administrative housing
discrimination complaints annually for the fiscal years 2009-11; the EEOC reports the
filing of 93,277, 99,922, and 99,947 charges of employment discrimination for the
same time period. U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., FY2011 ANNAUL REPORT ON FAIR
HOUSING 18 (2011), available at http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/documents/huddoc?id
=FY2011_annual_rpt_final.pdf; Charge Statistics FY 1997 Through FY 2012, U.S. EQUAL EMP.
OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/charges.cfm
(last visited Nov. 27, 2013).
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some might claim that even the possibility of litigation, let alone a
trial, could deter some risk-averse governmental entities from
revitalizing predominantly minority neighborhoods. Yet, disparate
impact has been an available theory under the FHA for forty years, it
has been used in housing improvement cases, and it has been
overwhelmingly unsuccessful. If governmental entities have been
slow to revitalize, the disparate impact standard is not the likely cause.
As shown in Parts II and III, the lower courts have overwhelmingly
controlled for perverse outcomes in FHA disparate impact cases over
the past forty years. Only one housing improvement case had ever
resulted in a positive decision for plaintiffs on appeal prior to the
Magner and Mount Holly decisions.288 Only two reversals of summary
judgments reinstating FHA disparate impact claims had ever
occurred prior to Magner and Mount Holly, but neither involved
housing improvement plans. Whatever one thinks of the Magner and
Mount Holly fact patterns, the appellate courts’ decision to send these
fact-intensive challenges to trial is less than audacious. Some
members of the Supreme Court might strike the balance differently,
but this fact alone does not warrant the complete and total
elimination of the disparate impact theory from the FHA. The
Court’s interest in reviewing the validity of the theory based merely
on a couple of mid-litigation successes for plaintiffs (who may yet lose
at trial) suggests a zero tolerance for any possible unfairness visited
on a disparate impact defendant. In eliminating the FHA disparate
impact theory, however, the Court would be exhibiting an
unbounded tolerance for unfairness visited on an unspecified
number of future plaintiffs, including those challenging exclusionary
housing barriers that perpetuate racial segregation. If the Court
decides, in the next case presented for review, that housing
improvement plans are inappropriate targets of FHA disparate
impact theory, it should otherwise preserve the theory.
As noted in Part IV, a prima facie showing of disparate impact does
not end the inquiry.289 According to HUD’s regulation, defendants
will have an opportunity to justify their practices should a prima facie
case of disparate impact be made. Defendants will often have an
288. See supra Part III.B.
289. See Langlois v. Abington Hous. Auth., 207 F.3d 43, 49–50 (1st Cir. 2000)
(“[U]nder statutes like Title VII and Title VIII, merely to show a disparate racial
impact is normally not enough to condemn: a vast array of measures, from warmaking and the federal budget to local decisions on traffic and zoning, may have a
disparate impact. Thus, practically all of the case law, both in employment and
housing, treats impact as doing no more than creating a prima facie case, forcing the
defendant to proffer a valid justification.”).
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easier time justifying a housing improvement plan as opposed to a
housing barrier, though the justification must be supported by
evidence.290 If the housing improvement plan is sufficiently detailed
to reveal that it furthers the purposes of the FHA by increasing
housing opportunity and/or integration, plaintiffs may have a
difficult time establishing the existence of a less discriminatory
alternative despite the disproportionate displacement of protected
class members. To avoid summary judgment, plaintiffs will need to
offer proof either that the defendant’s revitalization plan is
illegitimate because it sets the stage for exclusion and/or segregation,
or its legitimate objectives can be met with less discriminatory effect
(i.e., less exclusion and/or segregation). This is a fact intensive
inquiry, which should be resolved in accordance with the purposes of
the FHA and in favor of integrated housing.291 If the facts
demonstrate that the housing improvement plan regardless of intent
has set the stage for disproportionate exclusion based on a protected
basis, then a trial rather than summary dismissal may be necessary.
Requiring some fact-intensive inquiries of disparate impact to be
tried rather than summarily dismissed is hardly a radical step towards
achieving integrated housing.
Third, the disparate treatment standard by itself is an insufficient
method of proof to capture the policies and practices used to
maintain racial segregation in the United States.292 Although
disparate impact challenges are frequently accompanied by disparate
treatment claims, plaintiffs in many of the important housing barrier
cases discussed in Part I did not prevail on their discriminatory intent
claims.293 Specifically, in City of Black Jack, Arlington Heights, and
Huntington, the plaintiffs prevailed on the FHA disparate impact
claim alone, with the appellate court not reaching or ruling against
plaintiffs on the disparate treatment claims.294
290. See supra note 262 and accompanying text.
291. See Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1294
(7th Cir. 1977) (“[I]f we are to liberally construe the Fair Housing Act, we must
decide close cases in favor of integrated housing.”).
292. Of course, if the Court eliminates FHA disparate impact claims, plaintiffs may
be able to assert them under state and local laws. See SCHWEMM, supra note 12, § 30:2
(“[E]ven if a state or local law’s language mirrors the prohibitions and remedies of
the Fair Housing Act, state courts are free to interpret that language more broadly
than its federal counterpart.”).
293. See supra Part I (discussing early and more recent FHA disparate impact cases
involving plaintiffs who attempted to challenge housing barriers using both disparate
treatment and disparate impact methods of proof).
294. See Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926, 937
n.7 (2d Cir.) (“Because we hold that we will no longer require a showing of
discriminatory intent in Title VIII disparate impact claims, we do not review Judge
Glasser’s findings on intent to discriminate.”), aff’d per curiam, 488 U.S. 15 (1988);
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To elaborate, community members will frequently express racial
animus when acting in support of housing barriers.295 However, their
discriminatory purpose will not always be imputed to public sector
decision makers.296 As noted by the Fourth Circuit in Smith v. Town of
Clarkton:297
Municipal officials acting in their official capacities seldom, if ever,
announce on the record that they are pursuing a particular course
of action because of their desire to discriminate against a racial
minority. Even individuals acting from invidious motivations
realize the unattractiveness of their prejudices when faced with
United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179, 1185 n.3 (8th Cir. 1974) (noting,
despite support in the record for a finding of intent, that “we do not base our
conclusion that the Black Jack ordinance violates Title VIII on a finding that there
was an improper purpose”); Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d at 1287 (noting that the court
had affirmed the district court’s earlier finding that there was no discriminatory
purpose behind the Village’s refusal to rezone); cf. Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo,
564 F.2d 126, 144–45 (3d Cir. 1977) (affirming district court finding that the City of
Philadelphia was racially motivated in its opposition to a housing project, but not
making intent finding with respect to the local housing and redevelopment
authorities). The Seventh Circuit in Arlington Heights cites Smith v. Anchor Bldg. Corp.,
536 F.2d 231 (8th Cir. 1976), as a discriminatory effects case with insufficient intent
evidence to support independent relief. Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d at 1292. With the
benefit of several decades of hindsight, Smith reads as a disparate treatment case
based on circumstantial evidence and citing discriminatory effects cases for added
support. Smith, 536 F.2d at 234–36.
295. See Huntington Branch, 844 F.2d at 929 (noting that town officials, presumably
attempting to placate racial opposition, “repeatedly told whites opposing the . . .
project that they would impose a racial quota on occupancy”); Smith v. Town of
Clarkton, 682 F.2d 1055, 1062 (4th Cir. 1982) (discussing evidence of a constituent
statement made off the public record that “he did not want ‘coons either next door
or in the town’”); see also Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429
U.S. 252, 257–58 (1977) (“Some of the comments, both from opponents and
supporters, addressed what was referred to as the ‘social issue’ . . . of introducing at
this location in Arlington Heights low- and moderate-income housing . . . that would
probably be racially integrated.”); City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d at 1185 n.3 (“Racial
criticism of Park View Heights was made and cheered at public meetings.”).
296. Compare Smith, 682 F.2d at 1066 (“There can be no doubt that the defendants
knew that a significant portion of the public opposition was racially inspired, and
their public acts were a direct response to that opposition.”), and United States v.
City of Parma, 494 F. Supp. 1049, 1083 (N.D. Ohio 1980) (finding that “Parma
officials, reacting to racial considerations, departed from their normal practices in
determining to reject the . . . building permit application”), with Metro. Hous. Dev.
Corp. v. Vill. of Arlington Heights, 373 F. Supp. 208, 211 (N.D. Ill. 1974)
(“[Citizens’] motive[s] may well be opposition to minority or low-income groups, at
least in part, but the circumstantial evidence does not warrant the conclusion that
this motivated the defendants. They have zoned 60 tracts for the R-5 use and some
of it is still vacant and available to plaintiff . . . .”). See generally Arlington Heights, 558
F.2d at 1292 (“The bigoted comments of a few citizens, even those with power,
should not invalidate action which in fact has a legitimate basis.”). For an example
of statements made by the public decision maker, rather than community members,
see Resident Advisory Bd., 564 F.2d at 136 n.14 (“Mayor Rizzo stated that he
considered public housing to be the same as Black housing . . . [and] therefore felt
that there should not be any public housing placed in White neighborhoods because
people in White neighborhoods did not want Black people moving in with them.”).
297. 682 F.2d 1055 (4th Cir. 1982).
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their perpetuation in the public record. It is only in private
conversation, with individuals assumed to share their bigotry, that
open statements of discrimination are made, so it is rare that these
statements can be captured for purposes of proving racial
discrimination in a case such as this.298

Fourth, discriminatory purpose is not always the most pertinent or
salient area of inquiry when examining housing practices with
discriminatory effects. Focusing on the effect of a practice shifts
focus away from the hearts and minds of decision makers and instead
on the way in which a current practice tends to perpetuate and
reinforce old patterns of segregation and exclusion.299 A twenty-first
century local government bureaucrat or elected official did not
create racial segregation in housing, but he or she can virtually
guarantee its perpetuation, with or without discriminatory purpose,
by simply engaging in practices that help maintain the residential
status quo.300 This could include not only adopting new rules but also
enforcing longstanding zoning ordinances that “effectively foreclose
the construction of any low-cost housing” in an all-white
neighborhood.301 Officials also can take advantage of facially neutral
rules that “bear no relation to discrimination upon passage, but
298. Id. at 1064. The Smith court ultimately found the evidence sufficient to
sustain liability under either the effects test or one requiring the showing of
discriminatory intent. Id. at 1067. Of course, discriminatory purpose can be proven
by circumstantial evidence of the kind described by the Supreme Court in Arlington
Heights, such as historical background, the particular sequence of events leading up
to the decision, substantive and procedural departures from normal practice, and
legislative history. See Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266–68; see also Dews v. Town of
Sunnyvale, 109 F. Supp. 2d 526, 573 (2000) (concluding that the Town of
Sunnyvale’s “zoning policies and practices were done with discriminatory intent”
under the Arlington Heights factors).
299. See John Stick, Justifying a Discriminatory Effect Under the Fair Housing Act: A
Search for the Proper Standard, 27 UCLA L. REV. 398, 428 (1979) (“[A]ny interpretation
of Title VIII that renders it ineffective in combating the large proportion of
segregation attributable to practices not intentionally discriminatory, but
discriminatory in effect, cannot carry out [Congress’s] legislative intent.”).
300. See Huntington Branch, 844 F.2d at 934 (“[A]n intent requirement would strip
the statute of all impact on de facto segregation”); City of Parma, 494 F. Supp. at 1096
(“These elected officials were opposed to any action which could change the virtually
all-white composition of Parma’s neighborhoods.”).
301. Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d at 1285, 1292–93 (“If the effect of a zoning scheme
is to perpetuate segregated housing, neither common sense nor the rationale of the
Fair Housing Act dictates that the preclusion of minorities in advance should be
favored over the preclusion of minorities in reaction to a plan which would create
integration.”(footnote omitted)); see also Dews, 109 F. Supp. 2d at 568 (“There is no
question that Sunnyvale’s planning and zoning practices as well as its preclusion of
private construction of multifamily and less costly single-family housing perpetuate
segregation in a town that is 97 percent white.”); Richard A. Primus, The Future of
Disparate Impact, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1341, 1347 (“The canonical failure of equal
protection analysis, after all, was Plessy v. Ferguson’s refusal to understand that a
formally neutral action might carry a clear meaning about racial hierarchy.”).
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develop into powerful discriminatory mechanisms when applied.”302
The most cursory examination of history undermines the proposition
that the government can ever really be “neutral” on segregation.
When local governments are not helping to undo segregation, they
are almost always helping to keep it in place,303 with their actions
serving as the functional equivalent of intentional discrimination.304
In contrast to the employment context, in which the Court has
held that an employer’s structuring of its selection procedures in
anticipation of disparate impact liability can constitute intentional
discrimination under Title VII,305 a local government’s consideration
of its zoning ordinances to ensure that they do not disproportionately
exclude certain groups should not implicate what Helen Norton has
described as zero-sum notions of equality.306 Inclusive neighborhoods
do not “make identifiable third parties worse off in tangible ways.”307
302. Huntington Branch, 844 F.2d at 935.
303. See id. at 941–42 (noting that the town “demonstrated little good faith in
assisting the development of low-income housing” including “a pattern of stalling”
such efforts); City of Parma, 494 F. Supp. at 1097 (“Every time Parma was confronted
with a choice between decisions that would have had an integrative or segregative
effect, Parma chose the latter.”); Dews, 109 F. Supp. 2d at 568 (“Instead of sharing its
obligation to provide fair housing, Sunnyvale, by hiding behind its exclusive zoning
practices, is compelling neighboring communities to assume its obligation.”); see also
infra notes 314, 316 and accompanying text (rejecting a reading of the Equal
Protection Clause that would require governmental actors to accept the status quo of
racial segregation in housing).
304. See supra notes 29–40 and accompanying text (demonstrating how neutral
practices can be as exclusionary as intentional ones, particularly in the context of a
neutral zoning regulation as challenged in City of Black Jack); cf. Inclusive Cmtys.
Project, Inc. v. Tex. Dep’t. of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs, 860 F. Supp. 2d 312, 323–24
n.19, 331 (N.D. Tex. 2012) (finding that defendant state agency failed to justify
disparate impact resulting from its disproportionate denial of tax credits to proposed
developments in Caucasian neighborhoods and citing cases discussing disparate
impact as functionally equivalent to intentional discrimination).
305. Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 561–63 (2009). In Ricci, the New Haven
Fire Department refused to certify certain promotional examinations because of
concerns over the validity of the exams, which had a written and oral component,
and the disparate impact of the exams on African Americans and Latinos. Id. at 562–
63. The group who received high scores on the exams claimed that the refusal to use
the exams because of disparate impact against certain groups constituted intentional
discrimination against other groups, in violation of both equal protection and Title
VII. Id. The Court ruled only on Title VII grounds, concluding that “race-based
action like the City’s in this case is impermissible under Title VII unless the employer
can demonstrate a strong basis in evidence that, had it not taken the action, it would
have been liable under the disparate-impact statute. Respondents, we further
determine, cannot meet that threshold standard.” Id. at 563.
306. See Helen Norton, The Supreme Court’s Post-Racial Turn Towards a Zero-Sum
Understanding of Equality, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 197, 198 (2010) (arguing against “a
zero-sum understanding of equality [which, if applied in the constitutional setting]
would treat a government decision maker’s attention to racial and gender
hierarchies when choosing among various policy options as inherently suspicious-and
thus unconstitutional unless the government’s action survives heightened scrutiny”).
307. Id. at 258; see also Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 211 (1972)
(quoting 114 CONG. REC. 2706 (1968) (statement of Sen. Jacob Javits) (referring to
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In fact, “[m]ost disparate impact remedies avoid creating such
victims.”308 Even in the prototypical housing improvement scenario,
assuming it is framed by the purposes of the FHA, the governmental
entity would consider how to minimize the racially exclusionary
impact of its revitalization efforts. This consideration of prospective
impact might result in less displacement and exclusion of the affected
group, but not greater exclusion of the non-affected group.309 In this
way, Mount Holly would be a poor battleground for the “war between
disparate impact and equal protection” that Justice Scalia warns “will
be waged sooner or later.”310 Although there are members of the
Court who believe that any decision making based on a policy’s racial
outcome “place[s] a racial thumb on the scales” in violation of the
Equal Protection Clause,311 it is difficult to imagine that five Justices
would prohibit governmental entities from even considering whether
their actions perpetuate residential segregation.312 In the analogous
setting of school desegregation, Justice Kennedy refused to endorse
the view that “the Constitution requires school districts to ignore the
problem of de facto resegregation in schooling.”313 Instead, he regards
the notion that “the Constitution mandates that state and local school
“the whole community” as potential victims of discriminatory housing practices).
308. Primus, supra note 301, at 1345 (discussing a “visible victims” reading of Ricci
that would enable disparate impact doctrine to survive an equal protection challenge
if it does not disadvantage determinate and visible innocent third parties).
309. See SCHWEMM & PRATT, supra note 1, at 24 n.30 (“The FHA has no comparable
provision [to that in Title VII reflecting a concern about quota-like hiring] and,
indeed, examples of pro-minority affirmative housing programs have been virtually
non-existent throughout the FHA’s history.”).
310. Ricci, 557 U.S. at 595–96 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia in his
concurring opinion in the Ricci case warns of the “evil day” when the Court will have
to confront whether the disparate impact provisions of Title VII are consistent with
the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 594. It was possible, and even likely, that some
members of the Court considered Mount Holly a good case for framing disparate
impact theory in the least desirable way, given its apparent potential to stymie local
government efforts to eradicate neighborhood blight. See Primus, supra note 301, at
1385–86 and n.190 (discussing the importance of framing and suggesting that the
“victory in warfare often goes to the party who succeeds in maneuvering the fight to
its chosen ground”). Nevertheless, the equal protection arguments for destroying
disparate impact theory seem particularly weak under the FHA.
311. Ricci, 557 U.S. at 594 (Scalia, J., concurring). But see Primus, supra note 301,
at 1344 (stating that the “general reading” of Ricci, which would render disparate
impact theory unconstitutional per se because it entails race conscious
decisionmaking, “is not the only reading available, and it may not be the best one”).
312. See Norton, supra note 306, at 212–14 (discussing Justice Kennedy’s
unwillingness to embrace “easy solutions” in the context of school desegregation,
and his urging that school authorities remain “free to devise race-conscious measures
to address the problem in a general way and without treating each student in
different fashion solely on the basis of a systematic, individual typing by race”
(quoting Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 788–
89 (2007) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part))).
313. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 788 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
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authorities must accept the status quo of racial isolation in schools,”
as “profoundly mistaken.”314
The disparate impact theory, ironically, can be an important tool
for simply getting government out of the way of efforts to end racial
segregation in housing. Accordingly, courts have been particularly
receptive to disparate impact challenges against government action
“which interferes with an individual’s plan to use his own land to
provide integrated housing.”315 Only a strained reading of the FHA
would suggest that Congress intended to permit unjustified
governmental interference with its own purpose of opening
housing markets and creating more balanced living patterns. An
equally strained reading of the Equal Protection Clause would
mandate that governmental actors and others accept the status
quo of racial isolation in housing.316 As recognized in Arlington, it
is clear that “[c]onduct that has the necessary and foreseeable
consequence of perpetuating segregation can be as deleterious as
purposefully discriminatory conduct in frustrating the national
commitment to replace the ghettos by truly integrated and
balanced living patterns.”317

314. Id. In the school context, Justice Kennedy would not impose strict scrutiny
on race conscious mechanisms that “do not lead to different treatment based on a
classification that tells each student he or she is to be defined by race.” Id. at 789.
315. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1293
(7th Cir. 1977); see also Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 844
F.2d 926, 940–41 (2d Cir.) (“In balancing the showing of discriminatory effect
against the import of the [defendant’s] justifications, we note our agreement with
the Seventh Circuit that the balance should be more readily struck in favor of the
plaintiff when it is seeking only to enjoin a municipal defendant from interfering
with its own plans rather than attempting to compel the defendant itself to build
housing.”), aff’d per curiam, 488 U.S. 15 (1988); Smith v. Town of Clarkton, 682 F.2d
1055, 1065(4th Cir. 1982) (noting that the plaintiff did not seek injunctive relief to
force the city to build public housing).
316. See Barry Goldstein & Patrick O. Patterson, Ricci v. DeStefano: Does It Herald
an “Evil Day,” or Does It Lack “Staying Power”?, 40 U. MEM. L. REV. 705, 793–94 (2010)
(“[E]xamining statutory disparate-impact provisions under the various applicable
levels of equal protection review may lead to a bizarre world in which the use of a
disparate-impact standard is permissible for groups that receive lower levels of
scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause but not for those that receive the highest
level of scrutiny and therefore are in theory entitled to the most protection—those
who are discriminated against based on race, national origin, or religion.”).
317. Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d at 1289 (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted); see also United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179, 1185 (8th Cir.
1974) (“[T]he arbitrary quality of thoughtlessness can be as disastrous and unfair to
private rights and the public interest as the perversity of a willful scheme.” (quoting
Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 497 (D.D.C. 1967))).
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CONCLUSION

After forty years of FHA disparate impact jurisprudence, the
Supreme Court has decided to review the theory in the exceedingly
rare context of summary judgment reversals reinstating plaintiffs’
claims. This Article labels these cases, Magner and Mount Holly,
“housing improvement” cases because they involve disparate impact
challenges to plans or regulations that purportedly improve housing
while displacing persons of color at disproportionate rates. These
cases may be contrasted with “housing barrier” cases, which involve
challenges to regulations that perpetuate segregation by preventing
housing opportunities for minority groups outside of neighborhoods
where they already live. Housing barrier cases frequently involve
removing barriers to neighborhoods that can provide alternatives to
substandard housing,318 whereas housing improvement cases
frequently involve preventing displacement from housing alleged to
be substandard.319 Housing barrier cases promote the highest ideals
of the FHA, while housing improvement cases meet protected class
members where they are—in segregated, substandard housing.
Housing barrier cases help protected class members climb the
housing ladder to greater opportunity; housing improvement cases
help prevent protected class members from being pushed down the
ladder or knocked off altogether in the name of improvement.
Although disparate impact challenges to housing improvement plans
can further the purposes of the FHA on the right facts, prior to
Magner and Mount Holly plaintiffs at the appellate level had only
succeeded on this type of claim once in the history of the FHA.
As the quantitative and qualitative analysis of this Article
demonstrates, the circuit courts first allowing discriminatory effects to
be used as a method of proof in FHA cases considered the theory in
the context of housing barrier cases. The courts recognized the
broad purpose of the FHA to “replace the ghettos ‘by truly integrated
and balanced living patterns’”320 and saw FHA disparate impact
challenges to housing barriers as essential to achieving this purpose.

318. See Town of Clarkton, 682 F.2d at 1065 (noting, in the context of challenging a
housing barrier regulation, that the black population was the “population most in
need of new construction to replace substandard housing”).
319. See supra notes 16–17 and accompanying text (describing that challenges to
housing improvement regulations typically stem from the disproportionate
impact on minorities displaced by the demolition or rehabilitation of housing
units); see also supra Part II (reviewing cases involving challenges to housing
improvement regulations).
320. Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 211 (1972) (quoting 114
CONG. REC. 3422 (1968) (statement of Sen. Walter Mondale)).
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In the forty years since those earliest housing barrier cases were
decided, plaintiffs have struggled to obtain and preserve positive
outcomes using the disparate impact theory. Yet, the predominant
type of case considering the FHA disparate impact theory at the
appellate level remains the housing barrier challenge. And, not
surprisingly, housing barrier challenges are the predominant type of
case among those positive outcomes achieved by plaintiffs at the
appellate level.
The relative success of housing barrier challenges using disparate
impact theory might be explained by the close nexus between these
claims and the anti-segregation purpose of the FHA. The disparate
treatment method of proof will capture only a fraction of housing
barriers enacted or enforced in a way that perpetuates segregation.
We have fallen short of achieving Congress’s integration purpose in
enacting the FHA, even with the disparate impact theory.321 It is
difficult to imagine how we would fare without it.

321. See Hispanics United of DuPage Cnty. v. Vill. of Addison, 988 F. Supp. 1130,
1135 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (“The hallmark of a great society—a true racially and ethnically
integrated community—is an elusive goal that unfortunately still has not been
achieved in most urban and suburban communities.”).
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APPENDIX A: FORTY YEARS OF FHA DISPARATE IMPACT CLAIMS—
REVERSE CHRONOLOGICAL LISTING OF APPELLATE CASES 322
Case Name

Date

Keller v. City of Fremont,
719 F.3d 931 (8th Cir.
2013)

June 28 2013

Steed v. EverHome Mortg.
Co., 477 F. App’x 722 (11th
Cir. 2012)
Cinnamon Hills Youth
Crisis Ctr., Inc. v. Saint
George City, 685 F.3d 917
(10th Cir. 2012)

July 11, 2012

Hopkins v. Springfield
Hous. Auth., 485 F. App’x.
137 (7th Cir. 2012)

July 02, 2012

HDC, LLC v. City of Ann
Arbor, 675 F.3d 608 (6th
Cir. 2012)

Mar. 30, 2012

*Mt. Holly Gardens Citizens
in Action, Inc. v. Twp. of
Mount Holly, 658 F.3d 375
(3d Cir. 2011)

Sept. 13, 2011

Greater New Orleans Fair
Hous. Action Ctr. v. U.S.
Dep’t of Hous. & Urban
Dev., 639 F.3d 1078 (D.C.
Cir. 2011)

Apr. 08, 2011

R.J. Invs. LLC v. Bd. of
Cnty. Comm’rs for Queen
Anne’s Cnty., 414 F. App’x.
551 (4th Cir. 2011)

Mar. 04, 2011

July 03, 2012

Ruling
Reversing summary judgment in favor of
plaintiff landlord on disparate impact
challenge to ordinance’s rental provisions
requiring prospective tenants to disclose
their immigration status and subjecting
landlord to criminal penalties for
harboring illegal aliens, based on failure
to identify a specific disparate impact
sufficient to establish a prima facie case
Affirming summary judgment dismissing
disparate impact claim based on failure to
establish prima facie case
Affirming summary judgment dismissing
disparate impact claim because residential
treatment facility challenging zoning
ordinance “produced no evidence of
disparate impact.”
Affirming denial of preliminary injunction
on disparate impact claim challenging
housing authority policy of inspections
and subsidy reductions, based on failure to
demonstrate impact
Affirming dismissal of impact claim
because of failure to plead sufficient facts
demonstrating that city’s cancellation of
option agreement had disparate impact
against people with disabilities
Reversing summary judgment and
reinstating plaintiffs’ disparate impact
challenge to a redevelopment plan
requiring demolition of affordable homes,
finding that plaintiffs established prima
facie case of impact on black and Hispanic
persons and created fact issue on the
existence of less discriminatory
alternatives
Affirming district court’s denial of
plaintiffs’ first motion for temporary
restraining order and preliminary
injunction and reversing granting of
plaintiffs’ second motions for more
narrow injunction, finding that data
offered to show disparate impact of grant
formula in program designed to help
homeowners rebuild after hurricanes fell
short and could not establish likelihood of
success on the merits
Affirming judgment after trial entered
against developer plaintiff on disparate
impact claim challenging county board’s
refusal to amend its water and sewerage
plan to permit development

322. Positive outcomes for plaintiffs are designated with an asterisk.
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Date

Smith v. N.Y.C. Hous.
Auth., 410 F. App’x 404 (2d
Cir. 2011)

Feb. 18, 2011

Estate of Davis v. Wells
Fargo Bank, 633 F.3d 529
(7th Cir. 2011)

Jan. 12, 2011

*Gallagher v. Magner,
619 F.3d 823 (8th Cir.
2010)

Sept. 01, 2010

White Oak Property Dev.,
LLC v. Washington Twp.,
Ohio, 606 F.3d 842 (6th
Cir. 2010)

June 04, 2010

Quad Enters. Co., LLC v.
Town of Southold, 369 F.
App’x. 202 (2d Cir 2010)

Mar. 10, 2010

Ungar v. N.Y.C. Hous.
Auth., 363 F. App’x. 53 (2d
Cir. 2010)

Jan. 26, 2010

Massbaum v. WNC Mgmt.,
361 F. App’x. 904 (9th Cir.
2010)

Jan. 11, 2010

Artisan/Am. Corp. v. City of
Alvin, 588 F.3d 291 (5th
Cir. 2009)

Nov. 13, 2009

*Comm. Concerning Cmty.
Improvement v. City of
Modesto, 583 F.3d 690 (9th
Cir. 2009)

Oct. 8, 2009

Bonasera v. City of
Norcross, 342 F. App’x. 581
(11th Cir. 2009)

Aug. 21, 2009

Green v. Cal. Court
Apartments LLC, 321 F.
App’x. 589 (9th Cir. 2009)

Apr. 2, 2009

423

Ruling
Affirming dismissal of complaint for
failure to identify facially neutral policy
with discriminatory effect against people
with disabilities
Affirming summary judgment for lack of
evidence showing defendant’s conduct
had a racially based disparate impact on
borrowers
Reversing summary judgment and
reinstating plaintiff landlords’ disparate
impact challenge to city’s code
enforcement scheme for increasing costs
and decreasing availability of affordable
housing, finding that plaintiffs established
prima facie case of racial impact and
created fact issue on less discriminatory
alternatives
Affirming summary judgment in favor of
township on disparate impact claim based
on developer’s presenting “no evidence”
of possible racial impact of prohibition of
multi-family dwellings
Affirming summary judgment against
developer of senior housing for
inadequate showing of disparate impact of
density and multifamily zoning restrictions
on the basis of disability
Affirming summary judgment against
plaintiffs for lack of showing that public
housing authority tenant selection and
assignment plan had disparate impact on
orthodox Jew
Affirming summary judgment on disparate
impact claim based on failure of proof;
claim not discernible
Affirming summary judgment based on
inadequate showing of discriminatory
impact in denial of permit for tax credit
housing pursuant to spacing ordinance;
most of low income housing units in
county located in city of Alvin
Reversing dismissal of FHA disparate
impact claim based on summary judgment
evidence regarding timely provision of law
enforcement personnel; affirming
dismissal on provision of sewer services
and infrastructure
Affirming summary judgment dismissing
disparate impact claim that selective
enforcement of zoning ordinance created
disparate impact on Hispanic persons,
based on insufficient evidence; claim
centered on enforcement and not facially
neutral ordinance itself
Affirming summary judgment dismissing
disparate treatment and disparate impact
claims against rental apartments for
failure to raise triable issues
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Schwarz v. City of Treasure
Island, 544 F.3d 1201 (11th
Cir. 2008)

Oct. 8, 2008

Greengael, LC v. Bd. of
Superiors of Culpeper
Cnty., 313 F. App’x. 577
(4th Cir. 2008)
Khalil v. Farash Corp., 277
F. App’x. 81 (2d Cir. 2008)

Sept. 5, 2008

Budnick v. Town of
Carefree, 518 F.3d 1109
(9th Cir. 2008)

Mar. 11, 2008

Wadley v. Park at
Landmark, LP, 264 F.
App’x. 279, (4th Cir. 2008)

Feb. 12, 2008

Graoch Assocs. # 33, L.P. v.
Louisville/Jefferson Cnty.
Metro Human Relations
Comm’n, 508 F.3d 366 (6th
Cir. 2007)

Nov. 21, 2007

Bonvillian v. Lawler-Wood
Hous., LLC, 242 F. App’x.
159 (5th Cir. 2007)

July 13, 2007

Reinhart v. Lincoln Cnty,
482 F.3d 1225 (10th Cir.
2007)

Apr. 9, 2007

Hallmark Developers, Inc.
v. Fulton Cnty., 466 F.3d
1276 (11th Cir. 2006)

Oct. 12, 2006

2922 Sherman Ave.
Tenants’ Ass’n v. District of
Columbia, 444 F.3d 673
(D.C. Cir. 2006)

Apr. 14, 2006

Affordable Hous. Dev.
Corp. v. City of Fresno, 433
F.3d 1182 (9th Cir. 2006)

Jan. 11, 2006

Cmty. Servs. Inc. v. Wind
Gap Mun. Auth., 421 F.3d
170 (3d Cir. 2005)

Aug. 31, 2005

May 7, 2008

Ruling
Affirming summary judgment dismissing
halfway house disparate impact challenge
to occupancy turnover rule, based on lack
of prima facie evidence
Affirming grant of summary judgment
under FHA for lack of evidence of racially
discriminatory effect of zoning change
Affirming summary judgment dismissing
disparate impact challenge to lease rule
based on familial status for failure to
establish prima facie case
Affirming summary judgment dismissing
disability-based disparate impact challenge
to permitting practices for lack of
evidence
Affirming summary judgment dismissing
FHA claim based on lack of evidence of
intent and impact regarding enactment of
section 8 non-renewal policy
Affirming summary judgment dismissal of
disparate impact claim challenging
landlord withdrawal from Section 8
program for failure to state prima facie
case, after finding that disparate impact
applied to such claims
Affirming summary judgment dismissing
disparate impact claim challenging postKatrina apartment building closure for
failure to show prima facie impact
Affirming summary judgment dismissing
disparate impact claim challenging land
use regulations for lack of proper prima
facie proof
Affirming judgment following bench trial
dismissing disparate impact challenge to
refusal to re-zone property for low and
moderate income housing; district court
had denied summary judgment on the
claim
Reversing jury verdict favoring tenants on
FHA disparate impact claim, and
reinstating intent claim, finding evidence
insufficient to support claim that initiative
targeting buildings in Hispanic
neighborhoods for closure disparately
affected Hispanic tenants
Affirming jury verdict in favor of city on
defense to disparate impact claim
challenging denial of bond issue for lowincome apartment complex; defense to
disparate impact defeated jury’s other
finding of prima facie case of impact
Reversing summary judgment in favor of
plaintiff service provider for people with
disabilities on disparate impact claim
based on erroneous determination on
disparate treatment claim
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Case Name

Date

Ruling

*Charleston Hous. Auth. v.
U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 419
F.3d 729 (8th Cir. 2005)

Aug. 18, 2005

Darst-Webbe Tenant Ass’n
Bd. v. St. Louis Hous. Auth.,
417 F.3d 898 (8th Cir.
2005)

Aug. 8, 2005

*Meyer v. Bear Rd. Assocs.,
124 F. App’x. 686 (2d Cir.
2005)

Mar. 7, 2005

Tsombanidis v. W. Haven
Fire Dep’t, 352 F.3d 565
(2d Cir. 2003)

Dec. 15, 2003

Koorn v. Lacey Twp., 78 F.
App’x. 199 (3d Cir. 2003)

Oct. 17, 2003

Oti Kaga, Inc. v. S.D. Hous.
Dev. Auth., 342 F.3d 871
(8th Cir. 2003)

Sept. 15, 2003

Hartman v. Greenwich
Walk Homeowners’ Ass’n
Inc., 71 F. App’x. 135 (3d
Cir. 2003)

Aug. 4, 2003

Good Shepherd Manor
Found. Inc. v. City of
Momence, 323 F.3d 557
(7th Cir. 2003)

Mar. 24, 2003

Fair Hous. in Huntington
Comm. Inc. v. Town of
Huntington, 316 F.3d 357
(2d Cir. 2003)

Jan. 17, 2003

Patel v. City of L.A., 47 F.
App’x. 799 (9th Cir. 2002)

Aug. 8, 2002

Affirming trial court ruling in favor of
plaintiffs on disparate impact challenge to
housing authority revitalization plan
calling for demolition of low income
rental units, but remanding for
reconsideration of injunctive relief
ordering re-occupancy of apartments
After assuming plaintiffs’ prima facie case
of disparate impact was demonstrated,
affirming trial court findings that
defendant housing authority justified any
disparate impact resulting from public
housing redevelopment plan with
legitimate objectives and plaintiff failed to
demonstrate that alternative plan would
meet objectives while reducing disparate
impact
Reversing dismissal of disparate impact
claim challenging rental pricing policy
charging more for groups over four on the
basis of familial status
Reversing bench trial ruling that fire code
had disparate impact on people with
disabilities, finding that plaintiffs failed to
establish prima facie case
Affirming summary judgment dismissing
disparate impact and other claims
challenging animal control ordinance for
lack of evidence of racial effects
Affirming summary judgment dismissing
disparate impact claim challenging state
policy of distributing housing funds, based
on failure to demonstrate effective
alternative policy without discriminatory
effects
Affirming summary judgment dismissing
disparate impact challenge to
condominium association policy requiring
request for variance from association
rules, based on lack of evidence
Affirming refusal to instruct jury on
disparate impact because of deficient
instruction and theory’s inapplicability to
particular facts relating to housing for
people with disabilities
Affirming denial of preliminary injunction
against construction of age-restricted
development; town’s practice of
concentrating family housing in racially
segregated areas and age-restricted
housing in white areas alleged to have
disparate impact and perpetuate
segregation
Affirming dismissal of complaints alleging
disparate impact of city’s finding that
hotels were public nuisances, based on
lack of allegations of discriminatory effect
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Omni Behavioral Health v.
Miller, 285 F.3d 646 (8th
Cir. 2002)

Apr. 2, 2002

Lapid-Laurel, L.L.C. v.
Zoning Bd., 284 F.3d 442
(3d Cir. 2002)

Mar. 15, 2002

Rekhter v. Cent. Park E.
Ltd. P’ship, Kauri Invs. Ltd.,
31 F. App’x. 506 (9th Cir.
2002)
Reg’l Econ. Cmty. Action
Program, Inc. v. City of
Middletown, 294 F.3d 35
(2d Cir. 2002)

Mar. 13, 2002

Feb. 19, 2002

Macone v. Town of
Wakefield, 277 F.3d 1 (1st
Cir. 2002)

Jan. 10, 2002

McZeal v. Ocwen Fin.
Corp., 252 F.3d 1355 (5th
Cir. 2001)

Mar. 28, 2001

Hack v. President & Fellows
of Yale Coll.,237 F.3d 81
(2d Cir. 2000)

Dec. 28, 2000

Veles v. Lindow, 243 F.3d
552 (9th Cir. 2000)
(unpublished table
decision)

Nov. 1, 2000

Fair Hous. Advocates Ass’n,
Inc. v. City of Richmond
Heights, 209 F.3d 626 (6th
Cir. 2000)

Apr. 13, 2000

Langlois v. Abington Hous.
Auth., 207 F.3d 43 (1st Cir.
2000)

Mar. 27, 2000

Ruling
Affirming summary judgment dismissing
FHA disparate impact claim challenging
investigation of child abuse allegations
against group home, which resulted in
closure of home for predominantly
minority and disabled children; concern
about child abuse was legitimate
justification for investigation
Affirming summary judgment dismissing
disparate impact challenge to land use
regime regarding senior housing for
failure to establish prima facie case
Affirming summary judgment dismissing
disparate impact challenge of Section 8
certificate holder to short-term lease
policy for lack of evidence
Affirming summary judgment dismissing
disparate impact challenge to denial of
special use permit for housing for people
with disabilities as inapplicable theory;
reversing summary judgment as to intent
and retaliation claims
Affirming summary judgment dismissing
disparate impact challenge to rescinding
of support for low income housing project
for failure to establish prima facie case
Affirming dismissal of complaint for
failure to adequately plead FHA disparate
impact claim against holder of note
secured by home
Affirming dismissal of complaint alleging
disparate impact and other claims based
on failure to allege that Yale’s on campus
housing requirement resulted in underrepresentation of Orthodox Jews in Yale
housing, a pleading standard later
abrogated by Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, N.A.,
534 U.S. 506 (2002)
Affirming jury verdict dismissing disparate
impact claim challenging rental policy
requiring at least one adult member to
speak fluent English for lack of evidence
and failure to object to exclusion of
statistical evidence
Affirming judgment following bench trial
dismissing disparate impact claim
challenging occupancy standards as
discriminating against families with
children
Ruling against plaintiffs on disparate
impact claim challenging local residency
preferences in distributing section 8
vouchers, but remanding for
determination of whether preliminary
injunction could be upheld on other
grounds
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Catanzaro v. Weiden, 188
F.3d 56 (2d Cir. 1999)

July 28, 1999

Jersey Heights
Neighborhood Ass’n v.
Glendening, 174 F.3d 180
(4th Cir. 1999)
Caractor v. Town of
Hempstead, 159 F.3d 1345
(2d Cir. 1998)
(unpublished table
decision)
Barklage v. City of San
Bernadino, 142 F.3d 442
(9th Cir. 1998)
(unpublished table
decision)

Apr. 5, 1999

Salute v. Stratford Greens
Garden Apartments, 136
F.3d 293 (2d Cir. 1998)

Feb. 5, 1998

*Gilligan v. Jamco Dev.
Corp., 108 F.3d 246 (9th
Cir. 1997)

Mar. 5, 1997

Gamble v. City of
Escondido, 104 F.3d 300
(9th Cir. 1997)

Jan. 10, 1997

Williams v. 5300 Columbia
Pike Corp., 103 F.3d 122
(4th Cir. 2006)
(unpublished table
decision)

Dec. 3, 1996

Pfaff v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous.
& Urban Dev., 88 F.3d 739
(9th Cir. 1996)

July 2, 1996

427

Ruling
On rehearing, affirming summary
judgment dismissing disparate impact
claim challenging demolition of two
buildings for failure to demonstrate
discriminatory effect of overall city
housing policies
Affirming dismissal of fair housing claims
challenging highway site-selection process

June 11, 1998

Affirming summary judgment dismissing
disparate impact claim challenging rental
rates set for section 8 program landlords
as racially discriminatory

Apr. 16, 1998

Affirming summary judgment on disparate
impact claim challenging zoning
ordinance and action on application for
an amendment and conditional use
permit to operate residential facility for
recovering addicts, based on lack of
evidence
Affirming summary judgment dismissal of
disability-based disparate impact claim
challenging landlord’s refusal to accept
section 8 program participants because
non-participation was legitimate reason to
refuse tenants
Reversing dismissal of disparate treatment
and disparate impact claims for failure to
plead prima facie case; pleading of
financial qualification not necessary for
disparate impact challenge to policy
refusing rental to AFDC recipients
Affirming summary judgment dismissing
disparate impact claim challenging denial
of conditional use permit to construct
housing for physically disabled, elderly
adults, based on inadequate impact
evidence
(Affirming summary judgment against
disparate impact challenge to
condominium conversion plan; refusing
to apply disparate impact when alleged
injury is solely product of facially neutral
price
Reversing HUD ALJ finding of disparate
impact of neutral occupancy restriction
against families with children; compelling
business standard arbitrary as applied
given less stringent reasonableness
standard previously applied to reasonable
occupancy cases
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Ng v. Quiet Forest II
Homeowners Ass’n, 87 F.3d
1321 (9th Cir. 1996)
(unpublished table
decision)

June 19, 1996

Simms v. First Gibraltar
Bank, 83 F.3d 1546 (5th
Cir. 1996)

May 31, 1996

Carlson v. U.S. Dep’t of
Hous. & Urban Dev., 81
F.3d 165 (8th Cir. 1996)
(unpublished table
decision)
Mountain Side Mobile
Estates P’ship v. Sec’y of
Hous. & Urban Dev., 56
F.3d 1243 (10th Cir. 1995)

Apr. 5, 1996

Affirming summary judgment dismissing
challenge to condominium rules requiring
participation of unit owners and
prohibiting rental of units for two years,
based on lack of evidence of
discriminatory purpose or impact on a
statutorily protected class
Reversing jury finding of disparate impact
of bank’s refusal to issue a commitment
letter based on predicted race of
cooperative housing owners, because
disparate impact claim cannot be based on
“single act or decision
Reversing HUD ALJ finding of disparate
impact of neutral occupancy restriction of
three persons per unit against families
with children; record did not support the
existence of such a restriction)
Reversing HUD Secretary decision finding
three-person occupancy limit in mobile
home park as having disparate impact,
based on adequate showing of business
necessity
Affirming jury verdict against plaintiff on
fair housing disparate impact claim and
trial court’s exclusion of expert witness,
based on refusal to apply disparate impact
to non-acceptance of section 8 housing
vouchers
Reversing denial of summary judgment
(where qualified immunity defense was
raised) and dismissing FHA claim
challenging closure of low income
housing units in series of code
enforcement sweeps as having disparate
impact on minorities; no proper showing
of impact made, nor showing of
discriminatory intent
Reversing dismissal of complaint alleging
policy governing site approval had effect
of excluding African American public
housing residents from unincorporated
area of county and perpetuated
segregation
Affirming summary judgment on FHA
disparate impact challenge to zoning
change from 12 units per acre [R-3] to 2
units per acre [R-2] based on insufficient
allegations and proof
Affirming summary judgment on religionbased disparate impact challenge to
condominium association rule prohibiting
balcony storage for insufficient evidence;
no showing that religious articles could
not be stored inside or that rule bore
more harshly on plaintiff’s Hindu religion

May 30, 1995

Knapp v. Eagle Prop. Mgmt.
Corp., 54 F.3d 1272 (7th
Cir. 1995)

May 17, 1995

Armendariz v. Penman, 31
F.3d 860 (9th Cir. 1994)

Aug. 1, 1994

*Jackson v. Okaloosa Cnty.,
Fla., 21 F.3d 1531 (11th Cir.
1994)

June 8, 1994

Orange Lake Assocs. Inc. v.
Kirkpatrick, 21 F.3d 1214
(2d Cir. 1994)

Apr. 14, 1994

Boodram v. Md. Farms
Condo., 16 F.3d 408 (4th
Cir. 1994)

Feb. 1, 1994

SEICSHNAYDRE.OFF.TO.WEBSITE (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

1/9/2014 3:50 PM

IS DISPARATE IMPACT HAVING ANY IMPACT?

Case Name

Date

*U.S. v. Badgett, 976 F.2d
1176 (8th Cir. 1992)

Oct. 9, 1992

S.-Suburban Hous. Ctr. v.
Greater S. Suburban Bd. of
Realtors, 935 F.2d 868 (7th
Cir. 1991)

June 19, 1991

Familystyle of St. Paul, Inc.
v. City of St. Paul, 923 F.2d
91 (8th Cir. 1991)

Jan. 8, 1991

Funk v. Loyalty Enters. Ltd.,
921 F.2d 279 (9th Cir.
1990) (unpublished table
decision)

Dec. 28, 1990

Vill. of Bellwood v. Dwivedi,
895 F.2d 1521 (7th Cir.
1990)

Jan. 30, 1990

*Doe v. City of Butler, 892
F.2d 315 (3d Cir. 1989)

Dec. 29, 1989

Edwards v. Johnston Cnty.
Health Dep’t, 885 F.2d
1215 (4th Cir. 1989)

Sept. 20, 1989

Nickell v. Montgomery
Cnty. 878 F.2d 379 (4th Cir.
1989) (unpublished table
decision)

June 20, 1989

Gomez v. Chody, 867 F.2d
395 (7th Cir. 1989)

Jan. 31, 1989

429

Ruling
Reversing district court ruling against
plaintiff after trial dismissing FHA
challenge to neutral one-person
occupancy limit, finding that disparate
impact against families with children not
justified
Affirming bench trial decision against
realtors who brought FHA challenge to
certain anti-solicitation ordinances as
having a disparate impact on black home
seekers and remanding fair housing
challenge to “for sale” sign ban
Affirming summary judgment dismissal of
disparate impact challenge to state law
and zoning code requiring dispersal of
group homes for people with mental
disabilities as justified by legitimate goal of
deinstitutionalization
Affirming summary judgment dismissing
white applicant’s disparate impact
challenge to first come, first served policy
for lack of sufficient evidence of racially
discriminatory effect
Reversing jury verdict for plaintiff based
on discriminatory effect instruction,
finding the disparate impact method
inapplicable to racial steering cases
Affirming summary judgment dismissing
disparate impact challenge by those
seeking shelter for domestic violence to
ordinance limiting number of occupants
in transitional dwellings, based on failure
to establish impact on women, but
remanding for consideration of impact on
familial status
Affirming dismissal of claim challenging
permitting of substandard migrant
farmworker housing for failure to plead
racially discriminatory effect
Affirming summary judgment dismissing
disparate impact challenge to zoning
ordinance eliminating “noncomplying”
multifamily uses and reverting to single
family zones, based on failure to
demonstrate racially disparate impact on
existing renters
Affirming summary judgment dismissing
disparate impact challenge to
rehabilitation of apartments declared
public nuisance resulting in displacement
of tenants who were 95% Hispanic and
60% of Hispanic population in area;
building would be rehabilitated and at
least 51% of the apartments occupied by
low or moderate income persons

SEICSHNAYDRE.OFF.TO.WEBSITE (DO NOT DELETE)

1/9/2014 3:50 PM

430

[Vol. 63:357

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
Date

Ruling

*Keith v. Volpe, 858 F.2d
467 (9th Cir. 1988)

Case Name

Sept. 19, 1988

*Huntington Branch,
NAACP v. Town of
Huntington, 844 F.2d 926
(2d Cir. 1988)

Apr. 5, 1988

Burrell v. City of Kankakee,
815 F.2d 1127 (7th Cir.
1987)

Apr. 6, 1987

Hanson v. Veterans Admin.,
800 F.2d 1381 (5th Cir.
1986)

Sept. 29, 1986

Latinos Unidos De Chelsea
En Accion v. Sec’y of Hous.
& Urban Dev., 799 F.2d 774
(1st Cir. 1986)

Aug. 12, 1986

Arthur v. City of Toledo,
782 F.2d 565 (6th Cir.
1986)

Jan. 24, 1986

Southend Neighborhood
Imp. Ass’n v. St. Clair Cnty.,
743 F.2d 1207 (7th Cir.
1984)

Sept. 17, 1984

Affirming bench trial decision enjoining
refusal to permit construction of two
housing projects for people displaced by
freeway construction, based on disparate
impact of refusal and inadequate
justifications
Reversing bench trial decision against
plaintiffs on disparate impact claim,
finding that refusal to amend ordinance
and rezone site to allow multifamily
housing to be constructed outside of a
racially segregated urban renewal area had
a substantial adverse impact on minorities
and perpetuated segregation in violation
of the FHA
Affirming judgment after trial dismissing
FHA disparate impact challenge to delay
in processing section 8 Housing Assistance
Payment contracts, based on lack of
evidence of discriminatory effect on
availability of housing to minorities and
evidence of concern about undue
concentration of assisted housing in first
ward
Affirming district court ruling against
plaintiff after trial on disparate impact
challenge to VA appraisal practices,
finding that trial court was entitled to find
evidence insufficient to establish racially
based negative impact on home values in
racially mixed neighborhood
Affirming bench trial ruling against
plaintiffs on disparate impact challenge to
city’s funding of housing improvement
program for focus on homeownership,
based on failure to establish prima case of
impact
Affirming bench trial decision against
plaintiffs on disparate impact challenge to
referenda repealing ordinances granting
authority to construct sewer extensions to
two proposed public housing sites, where
comparable housing in white
neighborhoods eventually built
Dismissing FHA disparate impact claim
after district court stayed for lack of
jurisdiction, finding that county’s alleged
failure to maintain tax delinquent
properties in black neighborhoods not
shown to violate FHA based on damage to
neighboring properties
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Date

Ruling

*Betsey v. Turtle Creek
Assocs. 736 F.2d 983 (4th
Cir. 1984)

June 18, 1984

*Smith v. Town of Clarkton,
682 F.2d 1055 (4th Cir.
1982)

June 29, 1982

Reversing bench trial decision against
plaintiffs on disparate impact claim
challenging building-wide evictions
pursuant to new all-adult rental policy,
finding that plaintiffs established prima
facie case based on evidence that 54.3% of
nonwhite tenants received eviction
notices, as opposed to 14.1% of white
tenants
Affirming bench trial decision finding
FHA disparate impact liability based on
town’s withdrawal from multi-municipality
housing authority, effectively blocking
construction of 50 units of public housing

*Halet v. Wend Inv. Co.,
672 F.2d 1305 (9th Cir.
1982)

Jan. 25, 1982

*United States v. City of
Parma, 661 F.2d 562 (6th
Cir. 1981)

Oct. 14, 1981

*Resident Advisory Bd. v.
Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126 (3d Cir.
1977)

Aug. 31, 1977

*Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v.
Vill. of Arlington Heights,
558 F.2d 1283 (7th Cir.
1977)

July 7, 1977

*United States v. City of
Black Jack, Mo., 508 F.2d
1179 (8th Cir. 1974)

Dec. 27, 1974

Reversing dismissal of FHA race-based
disparate impact challenge to an adultsonly rental policy at pleading stage,
finding allegations sufficient to state a
claim
Affirming bench trial decision finding
four land use ordinances to have
discriminatory effect in violation of FHA
and constituting part of a number of acts
having “the purpose and effect of
maintaining Parma as a segregated
community”
Affirming bench trial decision finding
disparate impact of local government
entities’ urban renewal activities in
removing black families from the urban
renewal area, leaving the area as an allwhite community, and terminating the
planned public housing project thereafter;
although the court did not adopt the
district court’s “compelling interest”
formulation for determining defendants’
burden of justification, defendants offered
no justification to overcome plaintiffs’
prima facie case
On remand from Supreme Court, holding
FHA violation could be found where
refusal to rezone property to permit
construction of federally financed low-cost
housing had discriminatory effect and
perpetuated segregation in the “almost
totally white” village of Arlington Heights;
remanding to district court to determine
FHA violation
Reversing district court finding of no
discriminatory effect, finding FHA
violation because of discriminatory effect
of zoning ordinance prohibiting
construction of any new multi-family
housing and excluding proposed lowincome integrated townhouse
development in virtually all-white
community
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APPENDIX B: FORTY YEARS OF FHA DISPARATE IMPACT CLAIMS—
LISTING OF APPELLATE CASES BY CASE TYPE323
Housing Barrier
 R.J. Invs., L.L.C. v. Bd. of Cnty. Com’rs For Queen Anne’s Cnty., 414
F. App’x. 551, (4th Cir. 2011)
 White Oak Prop. Dev., LLC v. Washington Twp., 606 F.3d (6th Cir.
2010)
 Artisan/American Corp. v. City of Alvin, 588 F.3d 291, (5th Cir.
2009)
 Greengael, LC v. Bd. of Superiors of Culpeper Cnty., 313 F. App’x.
577, (4th Cir. 2008)
 Reinhart v. Lincoln Cnty, 482 F.3d 1225 (10th Cir. 2007)
 Hallmark Developers, Inc. v. Fulton Cnty., 466 F.3d 1276 (11th Cir.
2006)
 Affordable Hous. Dev. Corp. v. City of Fresno, 433 F.3d 1182 (9th Cir.
2006)
 Macone v. Town of Wakefield, 277 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2002)
 *Jackson v. Okaloosa Cnty., 21 F.3d 1531 (11th Cir. 1994)
 Orange Lake Assocs., Inc. v. Kirkpatrick, 21 F.3d 1214 (2d Cir. 1994)
 *Keith v. Volpe, 858 F.2d 467 (9th Cir. 1988)
 *Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926
(2d Cir. 1988)
 Burrell v. City of Kankakee, 815 F.2d 1127 (7th Cir. 1987)
 Arthur v. City of Toledo, 782 F.2d 565 (6th Cir. 1986)
 *Smith v. Town of Clarkton, 682 F.2d 1055 (4th Cir. 1982)
 *United States v. City of Parma, 661 F.2d 562 (6th Cir. 1981)
 *Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126 (3d Cir. 1977)
 *Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283
(7th Cir. 1977)
 *United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1974)

Housing Improvement
 *Mt. Holly Gardens Citizens in Action, Inc. v. Twp. of Mount Holly,
658 F.3d 375 (3d Cir. 2011)
 *Gallagher v. Magner, 619 F.3d 823 (8th Cir. 2010)
 Bonasera v. City of Norcross, 342 F. App’x. 581 (11th Cir. 2009)
 Bonvillian v. Lawler-Wood Hous., LLC, 242 F. App’x. 159 (5th Cir.
2007)

323. Positive outcomes for plaintiffs are designated with an asterisk.
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 2922 Sherman Ave. Tenants’ Ass’n v. District of Columbia, 444 F.3d
673 (D.C. Cir. 2006)
 *Charleston Hous. Auth. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 419 F.3d 729 (8th
Cir. 2005)
 Darst-Webbe Tenant Ass’n Bd. v. St. Louis Hous. Auth., 417 F.3d 898
(8th Cir. 2005)
 Koorn v. Lacey Twp., 78 F. App’x. 199 (3d Cir. 2003)
 Patel v. City of L.A., 47 F. App’x. 799 (9th Cir. 2002)
 Catanzaro v. Weiden, 188 F.3d 56 (2d Cir. 1999)
 Armendariz v. Penman, 31 F.3d 860 (9th Cir. 1994)
 Nickell v. Montgomery Cnty., 878 F.2d 379 (4th Cir. 1989)
(unpublished table decision)
 Gomez v. Chody, 867 F.2d 395 (7th Cir. 1989)
 Omni Behavioral Health v. Miller, 285 F.3d 646 (8th Cir. 2002)

People with Disabilities
 Cinnamon Hills Youth Crisis Center, Inc. v. Saint George City, 685
F.3d 917 (10th Cir. 2012)
 HDC, LLC v. City of Ann Arbor, 675 F.3d 608 (6th Cir. 2012)
 Quad Enters. Co., LLC v. Town of Southold, 369 F. App’x. 202 (2d
Cir. 2010)
 Schwarz v. City of Treasure Island, 544 F.3d 1201 (11th Cir. 2008)
 Budnick v. Town of Carefree, 518 F.3d 1109 (9th Cir. 2008)
 Cmty. Servs., Inc. v. Wind Gap Mun. Auth., 421 F.3d 170 (3d Cir.
2005)
 Tsombanidis v. W. Haven Fire Dep’t, 352 F.3d 565 (2d Cir. 2003)
 Good Shepherd Manor Found., Inc. v. City of Momence, 323 F.3d
557 (7th Cir. 2003)
 Lapid-Laurel, L.L.C. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 284 F.3d 442 (3d
Cir. 2002)
 Reg’l Econ. Cmty. Action Program, Inc. v. City of Middletown, 294
F.3d 35 (2d Cir. 2002)
 Barklage v. City of San Bernadino, 142 F.3d 442 (9th Cir. 1998)
(unpublished table decision)
 Salute v. Stratford Greens Garden Apartments, 136 F.3d 293 (2d Cir.
1998)
 Gamble v. City of Escondido, 104 F.3d 300 (9th Cir. 1997)
 Familystyle of St. Paul, Inc. v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 923 F.2d 91 (8th
Cir. 1991)

Rental Policies
 Keller v. City of Fremont, 719 F.3d 931 (8th Cir. 2013)
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 Green v. Cal. Court Apartments LLC, 321 F. App’x. 589 (9th Cir.
2009)
 Wadley v. Park at Landmark, LP, 264 F. App’x. 279 (4th Cir. 2008)
 Graoch Assocs. # 33, L.P. v. Louisville/Jefferson Cnty. Metro Human
Relations Comm’n, 508 F.3d 366 (6th Cir. 2007)
 Rekhter v. Cent. Park E. Ltd. P’ship, 31 F. App’x. 506 (9th Cir. 2002)
 Hack v. President & Fellows of Yale Coll., 237 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 2000)
 Veles v. Lindow, 243 F.3d 552 (9th Cir. 2000) (unpublished table
decision)
 *Gilligan v. Jamco Dev. Corp., 108 F.3d 246 (9th Cir. 1997)
 Knapp v. Eagle Prop. Mgmt. Corp., 54 F.3d 1272 (7th Cir. 1995)
 Funk v. Loyalty Enters., Ltd., 921 F.2d 279 (9th Cir. 1990)
(unpublished table decision)

Familial Status
 Khalil v. Farash Corp., 277 F. App’x. 81 (2d Cir. 2008)
 *Meyer v. Bear Rd. Assocs., 124 F. App’x. 686 (2d Cir. 2005)
 Fair Hous. Advocates Ass’n, Inc. v. City of Richmond Heights, 209
F.3d 626 (6th Cir. 2000)
 Pfaff v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 88 F.3d 739 (9th Cir.
1996)
 Carlson v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 81 F.3d 165 (8th Cir.
1996)
 Mountain Side Mobile Estates P’ship v. Sec’y of Hous. & Urban Dev.,
56 F.3d 1243 (10th Cir. 1995)
 *United States v. Badgett, 976 F.2d 1176 (8th Cir. 1992)
 *Doe v. City of Butler, 892 F.2d 315 (3d Cir. 1989)
 *Betsey v. Turtle Creek Assocs., 736 F.2d 983 (4th Cir. 1984)
 *Halet v. Wend Inv. Co., 672 F.2d 1305 (9th Cir. 1982)

Lending/Appraisal







Steed v. EverHome Mortg. Co., 477 F. App’x. 722 (11th Cir. 2012)
Estate of Davis v. Wells Fargo Bank, 633 F.3d 529 (7th Cir. 2011)
Steed v. EverHome Mortg. Co., 308 F. App’x. 364 (11th Cir. 2009)
McZeal v. Ocwen Fin. Corp., 252 F.3d 1355 (5th Cir. 2001)
Simms v. First Gibraltar Bank, 83 F.3d 1546 (5th Cir. 1996)
Hanson v. Veterans Admin., 800 F.2d 1381 (5th Cir. 1986)

Housing Authority
 Hopkins v. Springfield Hous. Auth., 485 F. App’x. 137 (7th Cir. 2012)
 Smith v. N.Y.C. Hous. Auth., 410 F. App’x. 404 (2d Cir. 2011)
 Ungar v. N.Y.C. Hous. Auth., 363 F. App’x. 53 (2d Cir. 2010)
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 Langlois v. Abington Hous. Auth., 207 F.3d 43 (1st Cir. 2000)
 Caractor v. Town of Hempstead, 159 F.3d 1345 (2d Cir. 1998)
(unpublished table decision)

Condominium Policies
 Hartman v. Greenwich Walk Homeowners’ Ass’n, Inc., 71 F. App’x.
135 (3d Cir. 2003)
 Williams v. 5300 Columbia Pike Corp.,103 F.3d 122 (4th Cir. 1996)
(unpublished table decision)
 Ng v. Quiet Forest II Homeowners Ass’n, 87 F.3d 1321 (8th Cir.
1996) (unpublished table decision)
 Boodram v. Md. Farms Condo., 16 F.3d 408 (4th Cir. 1994)
(unpublished table decision)

Municipal Services
 *The Comm. Concerning Cmty. Improvement v. City of Modesto,
583 F.3d 690 (9th Cir. 2009)
 Edwards v. Johnston Cnty. Health Dep’t, 885 F.2d 1215 (4th Cir.
1989)
 Southend Neighborhood Imp. Ass’n v. St. Clair Cnty., 743 F.2d 1207
(7th Cir. 1984)

Other
 Greater New Orleans Fair Hous. Action Center v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous.
& Urban Dev., 639 F.3d 1078 (D.C. Cir. 2011)
 Massbaum v. WNC Mgmt., 361 F. App’x. 904 (9th Cir. 2010)
 Oti Kaga, Inc. v. S.D. Hous. Dev. Auth., 342 F.3d 871 (8th Cir. 2003)
 Fair Hous. in Huntington Comm. Inc. v. Town of Huntington, 316
F.3d 357 (2d Cir. 2003)
 Jersey Heights Neighborhood Ass’n v. Glendening, 174 F.3d 180 (4th
Cir. 1999)
 S.-Suburban Hous. Center v. Greater S. Suburban Bd. of Realtors, 935
F.2d 868 (7th Cir. 1991)
 Vill. of Bellwood v. Dwivedi, 895 F.2d 1521 (7th Cir. 1990)
 Latinos Unidos De Chelsea En Accion v. Sec’y of Hous. & Urban
Dev., 799 F.2d 774 (1st Cir. 1986)

